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CHAPTER

I

THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE EFFECT--AN OVERVIEW

Introduction

The Principle of Double Effect has served as

a

guide for both

statesmen and soldiers since the middle ages in determining which
acts in war are morally permissible and which are not.

It is used,

in particular, by those who make their moral decisions on the basis

of certain moral rules that concern the moral consequences of action.

This Principle of Double Effect (hereafter referred to as PDE) comes
into play in situations where an agent has the option of performing
an act with both good and bad consequences.

Advocates of PDE believe

that it is morally significant whether a bad consequence is intended

by the agent or merely forseen as incidental to an act that is in
all other respects morally acceptable.^

Of great interest to moral

philosophers discussing acts of war is how this principle applies
to the deaths of persons not directly involved in the prosecution

of the war.

Proponents of the PDE claim that while it is morally

impermissible to intentionally bring about the deaths of innocent

people during combat, either as
as a goal in itself,

means to

a

a

military objective or

it is permissible under certain circumstances

for an agent to choose a course of action which may bring about the

deaths of innocent people as

a

forseeable consequence.

In order to discuss this principle clearly it is perhaps a good

1

2

idea to take a look at it now.

One commonly accepted version of

this doctrine is that put forth by the Catholic Church.

It looks

like this:
PDE: An agent is morally permitted to perform an act
which results in both good and bad consequences if
and only if (1) the act itself is morally good or at
least indifferent, (2) the agent does not positively
will (intend) the bad effect but merely permits it,
(3) the good effect flows from the action at least as
immediately as the bad effect, and (4) the good effect
is suf f iciently„desirable to compensate for allowing
the bad effect.

As

I

said earlier the PDE is

a

moral principle that has been developed

because deontological philosophers of

a

specific sort have recognized

that oftentimes there are situations where

about both good and bad consequences. 3

a

particular act brings

They also have seen that the

moral rules they accept either give them conflicting guidance in the

matter or perhaps even give them guidance which seems to be intuitively
wrong.

Let's consider an example which presents the kind of problem the
PDE should be concerned with.

Major Lee is in charge of

a

special

anti-terrorist unit which has been sent to rescue ten hostages being
held by

a

lone gunman.

The gunman is holding the hostages in

office building and has threatened to shoot them all by
if his demands are not met.

a

a

local

certain time

Because his demands are so ridiculously

exorbitant Major Lee's government refuses to negotiate with the terrorist.

Lee moves his men into position and begins to consider the

alternatives open to him.

If he storms the building, there is a very

3

good chance that the terrorist will shoot most of the
hostages before
he and his men can reach them.

He does not have the assets to attempt

an aerial insertion onto the top of the building.

One by one Lee con-

siders other alternatives and finds them unacceptable.

He decides that

the best alternative is to position his expert marksmen in positions

where they can shoot the terrorist if he exposes himself.

They then

begin their wait.
As time begins to run out the terrorist brings one of the hostages
to the window with him to demonstrate his willingness to carry out

the threat.

He holds an automatic weapon to the head of

a

young man.

Major Lee seeing that the terrorist is about to shoot the hostage,
orders one of his marksmen to shoot the terrorist.

In doing so, he

knows that even if the marksman shoots the terrorist, it is still

probable the terrorist will kill the one hostage before he dies.
Nonetheless, the nine other hostages will have been spared

a

similar

Yet, all the same, it is both Major Lee's and the marksman's

fate.

intent to kill the terrorist, not the hostage.

In fact, the sharp-

shooter does shoot the terrorist, but before the terrorist dies he
pulls the trigger of his gun and kills the hostage.

Now this might not seem like such
the utilitarian persuasion.

merely

a

a

great problem to those of

Solving the problem would seem to be

matter of weighing the positive utility of the good effects

against the negative utility of the bad effects.

If the overall

utility of doing that act is at least as great as that of any per-

4

formable alternatives, then doing that particular act would
be morally

permissible.

In this case,

were open to Lee.

it seems that no other viable alternatives

Any other action he might take would probably bring

about the deaths of all ten of the hostages.

However, the action that

he did choose only brought about the death of one hostage.
a

Surely,

utilitarian would say, it is much better that only one hostage die

than all ten.
However, for the deontologist who is likely to support the PDE,
this is not an acceptable means of solving the problem.

The particular

type of normative ethical system he supposes correct would prevent him

from making such an overt appeal to utilitarian considerations.

Aquinas was one of the earliest proponents of this kind of system, as
well as the PDE.

Since Aquinas' ethical system has been widely accept-

ed by many "Just War" theorists, we will examine it to understand better

why the PDE is

a

necessary part of it.

According to Aquinas, we as human beings are rational and have
free will.

Moreover, as rational men, we perform our actions with

particular goals in mind.

We do not act just to be acting, but

instead to be achieving some end or consequence.

4

Accordingly our

actions should be judged not just in terms of the action itself, but
also in terms of achieving those consequences we acted to bring about.

Now while this theory is teleological (ends oriented) in nature, it
not to be confused with utilitarianism.

is

For under Aquinas' theory the

moral arbiter is concerned with specific moral rules.

That is, not

.
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only must the act itself be intrinsically neutral or good
but the

consequences of the act should be in accord with certain specific
moral rules that we men hold as binding.

For the purposes of this

discussion we will assume that the rules that Aquinas had in mind are
the Commandments

An Aquinian deontologist might propose, then, that these Commandments should be couched in terms of specific consequences our acts

bring about.
A:

One example of such

a

rule might be:

One should not perform actions which bring about
the deaths of innocent people.

An action would be right or wrong with respect to this rule in terms
of its specific consequences (i.e., whether someone was killed or not),

rather than judged right or wrong in terms of the overall utility of
all the consequences it brings about, as a utilitarian would claim.

Now Aquinas did not just espouse rules which are prohibitory in nature.
He also thought we have a duty to perform actions which result in

beneficent consequences.

Not only should we endeavor to prevent the

evil consequences that the ten Commandments prohibit, but we also

should promote good consequences by our actions.

Let’s consider this

as an additional rule in our set of Commandments.

Now the problem with this moral system becomes evident if we
consider our example situation.

If rule A applies, no action that

Major Lee is able to do is acceptable.
as being impracticable,

Yet, this conclusion, as well

runs counter to our basic moral intuitions.

Even if we apply our additional rule to act to bring about beneficent

6

consequences, we run into

a

dilemma.

For now Major Lee is enjoined

to save the nine but not to kill the one.

Clearly, this is impossible

given the circumstances.
It seems that Aquinas recognized that the sort of conflicts

have just described were inevitable in

a

1

deontological system where

the rules are absolute in the way that rule A is.

So,

1

think it is

safe to say that rules like A are not exactly what Aquinas had in mind.

Important to Aquinas's moral theory was the role the agent plays
in an action.

In particular he was interested in how the agent con-

ceives his action and its consequences when he performs the action.

What seems to have concerned him was that not everything that occurs
to others as a consequence of one's action is something that one

deliberately does to those people.
not capture that intuition.

Absolute rules, such as A, did

One, for example, could be held account-

able for any killing that comes about as

a

consequence of one's action,

no matter how remote the consequence or how little control the agent

has in the action.

Consequently, Aquinas designed the PDF to make

a

distinction between consequences that are deliberately brought about
by the agent and those which are not.
It is important to note, however, that the PDF is not just another

rule that is tacked on to some absolutist deontological theory.
is,

That

it is not that there are 10 (or 11) Commandments and then the PDF.

For this does nothing to solve the dilemma produced by rules like A.
By applying the PDF in this manner, one just confuses the matter all

5

7

the more.

Using our terrorist scenario as an example, rule A tells

us that Major Lee's action is morally wrong
(impermissible) while the

PDE would probably tell us Lee’s action is morally permissible.

A

dilemma still exists.
Instead, we should think of the PDE as an integral part of each
rule in our moral system.

killing are wrong.

It is not, for example, that all acts of

Certain non-deliberate killings are excused.

We

use the criteria of the PDE to determine which of these actions are

excused.

One might best think of the PDE's role as something like

caveat on each of the moral rules.

a

Let's adjust rule A to see how

the PDE modifies it:
(A'): An action in which the agent brings about the deaths
of an innocent person is morally impermissible except
when (1) the act itself is not morally wrong, (2) At
least one good consequence is brought about by the act,
(3) the agent does not intend to bring about the death
of the innocent person, (4) the good consequence results
from the action at least as immediately as the death
of the innocent person, and (5) the good consequence is
sufficiently desirable to compensate for allowing the
death of the innocent person.
I

think that it is safe to say here that the PDE is not just an

adjunct to an Aquinian deontologist

'

s

part of each rule within that system.

moral system, but an essential
It allows that certain actions

which bring about bad consequences are morally permissible.
By applying rule A' now we are able to extricate Major Lee from
his dilemma.

Allowing that the act of shooting

a

rifle is not morally

wrong. Major Lee's action fulfills the other four criteria of rule A'.
The good consequence brought about is that he rescues nine hostages.

8

Neither Major Lee nor the marksman intends that the one
hostage be
killed.

Practically speaking, the one hostage's being killed results

at the same time as the other hostages' being freed.

Clearly though,

it is not the death of the one hostage that brings about
the saving

of the other nine.

It is the death of the terrorist (who is not an

"innocent person") which brings about both consequences.
a

Finally,

good number of us would say that the saving of the nine hostages

is sufficiently desirable to compensate for the death of the one.

This is not to say that

I

do not recognize that there are those who

would disagree with me on this last point.

The Central Role of Intention in the PDF

The criterion that the agent should not intend the possible bad

effects of his action seems to me to be the foundation of the PDF.
We can better understand this intuition if we just pause

a

moment to

consider man's many limitations with respect to his intentions and

foreknowledge in the performance of his acts.

Clearly, men often act

with the intention of adhering to moral prescriptions and with the

belief that they do.

Yet, in the process of performing what they

believe is an act with good consequences they may unintentionally
violate some moral rule.

Man is inherently limited by his beliefs

about what his acts entail, his perceptions of the circumstances that
they are performed in, and his physical capabilities.

It is a rare

situation indeed, where an individual is aware of all the relevant

9

circumstances that influence his action, all the relevant
alternatives
open to him, and all the consequences that each alternative
entails.
It is rarer still for him to see how these factors
should be weighted

in order to reach the morally correct decision.

Because man is limited in these ways from objectively determining
what is right, he can rarely, if ever, be in the position to know with

absolute certainty that he is doing the morally right thing.

Perhaps

realizing this, early deontologists expanded the criterion for

a

morally permissible act to include the moral quality of the agent's
intentions in doing it, as well as the rightness or wrongness of the
act and its consequences.
It seems that this is what these men had in mind.

Aquinas, among

others, clearly said that one's intention in doing an act has

bearing on its moral quality.
will spoil

a

a

direct

For instance, an agent's bad intention

good act, but his good intentions will not redeem an act

that is known by him to be bad.^

The intuition was that if one

genuinely intended certain good consequences from an act and the act
in itself was not intrinsically bad, then the agent had not willingly

performed

a

sin and, hence, was not culpable, as one would be if one

had aimed for bad results.

They reasoned, it is one thing knowingly

to attempt to bring about evil consequences and quite another thing
to bring about evil effects that are merely foreseeable as a possible

side effect (or not forseeable at all) of one's intended act.
It is critical to note here that great emphasis was placed upon

10

how the agent viewed the act he was about to perform.

For example,

consider the case where John is practicing with his rifle
on
He is engaging pop-up silhouette targets at
ly 100 meters from him.

quite awhile.

a

a

range.

distance of approximate-

Suppose he has been shooting at them for

In the meantime his best buddy, Greg, has gone down-

range to fix some of the targets that have not been working.

assume that John does not know this.

Let's

As Greg is working on one of the

targets he straightens up to stretch his sore back.

John, mistaking

Greg for one of the silhouette targets, shoots and kills him instantly.
It is consistent with this early Christian ethical philosophy to say

that John did not intend Greg's death.
target, not to kill Greg.

His aim was to hit a silhouette

Hence, the moral status of the act is much

different than it would have been had he intended Greg's death when he
shot the rifle.

not intend it.

In a sense John intended the act and in a sense did

How John is judged revolves on his intent and his

knowledge of the act.
helpful, are ancillary.

The other criteria of the PDF, although perhaps

They are of help only after we have resolved

the question of the agent's intention in the matter.

The PDF is designed to help us in those cases where bad conse-

quences result from an action as well as good conseqeunces

though the agent intends only the good consequences.

,

even

If the agent

truly envisions his act to have the good consequences he intends,
even though the bad consequences are foreseeable, then his act is

morally permissible (provided the other three criteria are met).
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By applying the PDE to these cases, we add

a

subjective element.

It is not only important whether the agent's action
produces a bad

consequence which in turn causes him to violate
is also

a

moral rule.

It

important whether the agent deliberately intends that his

action bring about those bad consequences.

The PDE and Just War Doctrine

The PDE, then is extremely important in Christian Just War theory,
as Aquinas well knew.

He, as much as anyone, recognized that the

Christian religion is based upon living according to certain rules.
One general rule, stated as

a

strict deontologist (one who advocates

absolute rules like A) might, is that one should not act in

a

way

that will result in harm to other people; in particular one should

not destroy their property or kill them.
if one is fighting a war,

It is readily apparent that

it is particularly difficult to win without

doing some harm to one's fellow man.

That is what war is all about.

Of course, the deontologist critic might immediately reply that
this only goes to show that all war is evil and, hence, no war should

ever be fought.

Nonetheless, there are many deontologists

and present, who have rejected that conclusion.

,

both past

Early Christian phi-

losophers, such as St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, rejected the

view that all wars are evil, and hence morally wrong.

^

It was their

opinion that there are occasions when war can be justified.

Foremost among the conditions they supposed must be met in order

.
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to fight a "just war" was that one's cause must
be just.^

tical problem with this criterion is fairly obvious.

belligerent party in

a

The prac-

Typically, each

war believes his own cause to be just:

wise he would not be fighting.

other-

To recognize our enemy as having

a

just cause, while denying that our own cause is just, is to
deny the

legitimacy of our fighting the enemy and hence the legitimacy of
our
disputing the enemy's claim against us.^

As later just war theorists

discovered, this criterion is not suitable.

Belligerent nations which

adhere to divergent ideologies and religions can be expected to believe
their own cause just according to their own ideological and religious
beliefs.

More recent philosophers have, as

a

result, turned to a

different criterion to eliminate the problem mentioned above.

generally agree that

a

They

nation fights justly only if the country they

are fighting committed an act of aggression against them first.
is, wars may be fought only in self-defense.^^

That

While this criterion

also may be unequal to the task it is supposed to perform, it is

generally accepted today by most nations.

This, however, is not to

say that they always act in accordance with it.

Moreover, the question

of who has committed the first act of aggression is often itself in

dispute
What is important to remember here is that many philosophers

throughout history have believed that there are occasions when war is
justified.

The early Christian philosophers, for example, felt that

there were surely some instances where one ought to go to war to

13

preserve Christianity" or to prevent some great evil that
some other
country would perpetrate if it were not defeated by military
force.
I

think that the same kinds of reasons appeal to those
philosophers

and statesmen today who think that war may be justified.

Thus, if

one is a strict deontologist of the sort who would assert rules
like
A and accepts the view that there are at least some instances, how~

ever few, in which war can be justified, then one had better be

prepared to account for those moral rules which are violated in
that war.

This is the problem that the early Christian thinkers were faced
with.

On the one hand, Christian moral teachings required that one

ought to refrain from bringing about harm to his fellow man, while on
the other hand, he ought to bring about the destruction of the infidel

enemy, who fights unjustly.

Early theologians such as Augustine and

Aquinas resolved part of this dilemma claiming that one's obligation
to defeat (even destroy) the enemy while fighting for one's own nation

took precedence over the obligation not to harm one's fellow man, but
only if the nation's cause was just.^^

"Just national causes" took

precedence over prohibitions on individual action.

As a soldier of a

"just nation" the soldier fought for his sovereign and not merely for
himself.

His killing of enemy soldiers contributed to the overall

good consequences of his nation's fighting

a

just war.

Because it

contributed to these overall good consequences his action was thereby
permissible.

Even so, the class of people he was allowed to harm

14

was limited.

Generally speaking, war was the province of soldiers.

Soldiers by convention forfeited their right not to
be harmed.
However, this was not the case for the remainder of
the populace who
were not actively engaged in the fighting or directly
supporting the
fighting.

The major problem that remained for these early just war
theo~
rists was to account for those poor souls who were harmed as

result of the fighting yet who took no active part in it as

belligerent for either side.

a

side

a

To solve this problem these philoso-

phers developed the "Principle of Double Effect".

Surely, they

argued, there are instances in which we are justified in attacking
some legitimate military objective; even at the expense of the lives
of some innocent civilians whose deaths we neither desire nor intend.

The PDE, then, was their way of reconciling the general prohibi-

tion against bringing harm to non-combatants with legitimate attacks
on an unjust enemy.

Perhaps Suarez best summed up the views of these

early just war theorists on the subject of the PDE when he said:
For absolutely speaking whoever has the right to
attain the end sought by a war, has the right to
use these means to that end.
Moreover, in such a
case, the death of the innocent is not sought for
its own sake, but is an incidental consequence;
hence, it is considered not as voluntarily inflicted but simply as allowed by one who is m^^ing
use of his right in a time of necessity
.

.

.

First,

There are several things implied by this statement.
there is an assumption that the fighting and winning of

battle is

a

a

particular

"morally good" act (or at least "morally neutral") and

15

necessary

for the production of good consequences; such
as winning

the "just" war.

Secondly, the bad effects of killing the innocent

are sufficiently offset by the good effects of winning
the battle and,

ultimately, the war.

Third, the bad effects (the killing of innocent

persons) are not the causes of the good effects of winning the
battle.
Both the good effects and the bad effects are caused by the act of

fighting and winning the battle.

Finally, the soldier’s killing of

the innocent must be unintended even though that result might be

a

foreseeable consequence of fighting the battle.
It seems,

then, that Aquinas, Suarez and other just war theo-

rists have given the soldier a means to reconcile at least some of
the harm he may produce by his actions in war with the good that is

produced by some of those same actions
many of the moral dilemmas
of combat.

a

.

The PDF appears to resolve

soldier may be faced with in the course

He can justify the consequences of his action,

(sometimes)

by an appeal to how he views his act and its consequences.

Thesis

In the last 30 years or so more and more philosophers have

taken issue with the PDF.

They have felt that with the advent of

nuclear weapons and other weapons systems of immensely destructive
power, the PDF has been rendered inapposite.

Donald Wells has ex-

pressed this view in the following way:

Modern weapons make such sensitivity about the
recipients of our missiles inoperable and unNot only this, but the number of nonfeasible.
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combatants killed in war far exceeds that of
soldiers.
Whereas medieval man might pardonably
weep for the accidentally slain civilians, modern
man intends the death of every civilian slain
when he drops bombs from the air.^^

While it may have been

a

useful criterion in the past, they argue,

modern weapons are so devastating and indiscriminate in their killing
power that any attempt at justifying their use by means of the PDE
makes

mockery of moral discourse.

a

They believe that if atomic war

should take place the world would be devastated, if not destroyed.

Not only would

a

large portion of the world's population be eradi-

cated, but also the planet might be made inhospitable to future

generations.

Life as we know it would cease to exist.

The purpose of this paper is neither to attack nor support this
line of reasoning.

I

believe that the flaws in the PDE are much more

deeply rooted than in its inability to resolve cases concerning

nuclear weapons and the like.

While

I,

as a soldier, have certain

beliefs about the use of nuclear weapons,

I

wish to keep these

attitudes apart from the discussion which will ensue.

For

1

they are irrelevant in seeing just where the PDE goes wrong.
stead,

I

think
In-

intend to take the stance that the PDE is not now, nor has

it ever been a useful guide for determining which action among per-

formable alternatives is morally permissible.

It is not that the

"state of the art" of war has rendered the PDE obsolete.

It is,

instead, that there are basic flaws in the theory itself which render
it ineffective.

My strategy then, will be to show that not only is
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the PDE not particularly useful in determining
which course of action

open to the participants in

war is morally permissible, but that one

a

of its conditions is incurably ambiguous to the
point of being inco-

herent.

In doing this,

I

hope to show why any reformulation of the

doctrine is unhelpful.
In developing my thesis

I

will focus exclusively on the central

role that intention plays in this principle.

The criterion that

employs the notion of intention is the one that
matic.

While

the PDE,
I

I

I

I

find most proble-

believe that there are problems with other aspects of

will not pursue them in this paper.

have chosen to discuss the curious role that intention plays

in this principle because of its apparent significance in a variety of

moral problems; not just those concerned with combat.

This concept

of how intention plays a role in our moral evaluation of acts has

been accepted and used throughout much of the history of the Christian
church and the western world.

Moreover, it has come to play an

increasingly significant role in the moral and legal affairs of our
culture in general.

Certainly, our legal system reflects this trend.

Today, as much as ever, we consider very carefully what a moral agent's

intent (or motive) is in doing

a

wrong act before determining whether

he is "guilty" and, if so, how much guilt to ascribe to him.
is important whether or not the PDE is a viable doctrine.

next few chapters

I

will attempt to show why

the agent is misguided, if not wrong.

I

So,

it

In the

think this emphasis on

However, before discussing
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the role of intention in the PDE,

think it best to give some of my

I

basic assumptions with regard to the PDE and "Just
War" doctrine,
in general.

Some Basic Assumptions

First of all,

I

want to assume that in all likelihood wars will

continue to occur in one form or another.

My concern in this paper

is neither to determine whether wars can be justified nor to
evaluate

which criteria must be met for

a

war to be "just."

Instead,

am

1

interested in the practical problems of making moral decisions within
the context of war.

Whether one finds war, in general, to be justi-

fiable or not, one still has the responsibility for his moral decisions

should he find himself fighting in
Second, the PDE is

a

a

conflict.

principle which is used (1) by the agent to

help him decide which of the alternatives available to him is morally

correct and (2) by anyone evaluating the moral worth of the action he
does perform.

purely

a

While it might be argued that an agent's intent is

private matter that observers do not have access to,

1

think

it is safe to say there are a number of ways we can evaluate an

agent's intent.

One of the most common ways of doing this is by

asking the agent what his intent was in doing the act and then com-

paring his behavior before and during the act against his claimed
intent.

This method is often used in our legal system when trying

individuals for criminal offenses.

Even if the accused has admitted

6
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performing

a

wrong act, his intent may well be

mitigating or even

a

exonorating factor.
Next,

business.

1

would like to admit that war is

a

nasty and brutish

There is no way to get around this fact, even if one

claims the highest of ideals in its prosecution.

It is inevitable

that lots of people will be killed, including those who neither
take

part in the fighting nor participate in the material support of it.
From the outset

1

want to recognize that there is

a

fairly large

class of people who fall into the category of "innocent" people.

They are innocent in the sense that they are not participants in
war.

Clearly, there are hard cases in which it is difficult to

determine what an individual's status is in relation to the war
effort.

But our inability to make a clear distinction between the

innocent and non-innocent in certain hard cases does not entail that
such

a

distinction does not exist.

1

The point in recognizing this class of "innocents" is to confer upon them a special status during wartime.
of immunity.

This status is one

It is wrong to violate this immunity intentionally.

Whether or not these people have an absolute right to this immunity
is another matter and beyond the scope of this paper.

Clearly, how

one views the issue of human rights, especially in war, will have a

significant impact on the PDE.^^

Nonetheless,

I

would like to set

the matter aside and touch upon it as little as possible during the

course of this paper.

For the purposes of this paper,

I

will assume
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that the right of the innocent to immunity is a
right that may be

violated.

However, the agent who violates this right is under
the

heaviest of burdens to justify his doing so.
fullest awareness that this is
I

a

I

say this in the

most controversial position.

will assume that soldiers who participate in the fighting
of

and those civilians who provide direct support to the
"war-making

effort

forfeit any rights to immunity until they surrender or are

unable to perform their war-related missions.
a

soldier forfeits

to the enemy,

By this

I

mean that

his immune status until either (1) he surrenders

(2) he is

physically incapacitated, (3) he deserts and

actively avoids the prosecution of the conflict, or (4) hostilities
are ended.

Civilians in "war support" positions forfeit their

immunity until either (1) their nation ceases fighting, (2) they
remove themselves from a position of actively performing their job,
or (3) they are incapacitated and unable to perform their job.
In addition,

I

will not assume that the rights and obligations

which hold between individuals are the same as those which hold
between collective entities, such as warring nations, or those which
hold between

a

nation and the citizens of an enemy nation.

Suppose,

for example, that we recognize that we have an obligation not to

cause the deaths of innocent citizens of an enemy nation, yet may
kill its soldiery.

What then are our obligations to the enemy state

as a collective entity?

of a state?

I

Are we permitted to bring about the "death"

will grant that there are certain collective actions
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which cannot be done without the participation of
all (or at least
a

great many of) the individual members of that collective
entity.

But

think that participating members in

1

a

collective entity acting

as a part of that entity may have different obligations
to indivi-

duals who are members of other collective entities than
they normally

would acting on an individual basis.
Finally,

1

would like to point out that goals of military leaders

and statesmen in war oftentimes run counter to the moral prescriptions
of the deontologist

.

Their primary concern is directed towards what

is best for the nation state,

fight the war.

in terms of its ability to survive and

They are generally concerned with whether the overall

consequences of their military actions are best for their own nation.
While moral considerations may play

a

part in their calculations,

they do not necessarily play an integral part.
the deontologist

'

s

On the other hand

considerations concern what is best for everyone

in terms of moral good.

He determines whether an action in war is

morally good by appeal to certain moral rules which apply to the
consequences of that action.

From this we can see the essential con-

flict between the moral philosopher and the soldier.

Wars cannot be

fought without the use of enough force to cause the enemy to sue for
peace.

Thus, the claims of "military necessity" weigh heavily in any

situation in war where moral considerations also play

a

role.

The

question then becomes how to square the military objectives desired
by the statesmen and generals with the moral prohibitions imposed by

.
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the moralists.

I

will allow, for the time being, that this problem

can be resolved by the PDE.

I

will have more to say on this matter

later

With these considerations in mind let us now begin our
discus~
sion of the PDE in depth.

I

will begin with some basic considera-

tions of the agent in forming an intent and the notion of
intention
in general.

Both topics are important in establishing

for my later discussion.

a

framework

8

CHAPTER

II

INTENTION

Intention and Foreseeable Consequences
Most people who advocate the PDE feel there is an essential
dis-

tinction between

a

person's intending something and his foreseeing

that the same thing will come about as a consequence of what
he does.

They say that if the agent intends to do

a

most certainly has done

However, if he intends to do

a

wicked thing.

morally wrong act, then he

an act which is good but foresees that the act will have some bad

side-effects, then it is not so clear that the agent has done
morally- wrong thing when he performs that act.

a

It seems to them that

an agent's having an intention to perform an act entails, at the

least, his belief that his actions will very likely bring about the

results he desires.

Any side-effects brought about are only "in-

directly" intended, if intended at all.

Perhaps the consequences

of an act are indirectly intended if they are foreseen as probable
or possible.

1

If the results are foreseen as not very likely to

occur or as not occurring at all, then it is questionable whether
the agent even indirectly intends them.

An agent who does not fore-

see the act's side effects at all does not even indirectly intend to

produce them.
On the other hand, if the bad side effects are such that the
agent cannot even consider the act without seeing that the bad side
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effects are inextricably connected to it, then
PDE proponents agree
that this is no matter of mere "indirect" intention.

Surely the

agent must intend those consequences which he sees
are inevitably

bound up in performing the act in question.

On this view, the agent

who recognizes that his doing an act entails his bringing
about bad
results as well as good cannot claim he intends the one and
not the
other.

An Intention as

a

"Directing of the Will "

Elizabeth Anscombe in her article, "War and Murder" discusses
problem very similar to this one.

a

She states that an actor who know-

ingly performs an action which produces bad consequences in order to

bring about in turn still other good consequences cannot claim his
act as morally permissible.

The agent in seeing that the bad con-

sequences are concommitant and causally related to the good consequences cannot claim he intended the good but not the bad.

She

puts it this way;

I know a Catholic boy who was puzzled at being told
by his schoolmaster that it was an "accident" that
the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were there to
be killed... It is nonsense to pretend that you do
not intend
do what is the means you take to your
chosen end.

Thus, for Anscombe and others, if one's act will clearly result in

both good and bad consequences (the bad consequences almost certainly
being

a

means to bring about the good)

,

then one intends those bad

25

consequences as well as the good.
a

Anscombe, then, is concerned with

special case of an action that will produce with

probability both good and bad consequences.

high degree

a

a

One cannot both "direct"

himself to intend the good consequences and then allow
himself not
to intend the bad consequences.

Anscombe 's response above is to
tional action.

a

commonly held concept of inten-

Under this concept the agent's intending to do some-

thing may be considered in itself

a

separate internal act of the mind.

This internal mental act may in turn be produced and directed
by the

mind to the "appropriate intentional object" without regard to whether
the agent

intending to bring about good effects also means that he

s

will probably bring about dire consequences.

The agent merely has to

focus his intent on the appropriate good results and his action, what-

ever it may be, is permissible.
If this is supposed to be what an intention is, then we must face

some conclusions which seem to be counter-intuitive.
do not always have a voice in our head saying "Well

First of all, we
I

will result in both b and c...and that b is bad... But
b;

instead

I

will intend

c,

which is good..."

know my doing
I

a

won't intend

Clearly, if this

"mental dialogue" occurred every time we performed

a

voluntary action,

we would certainly respond to the exigencies of our environment much

more slowly and perhaps with

a

much greater awareness of what was going

on than we normally do.

Another problem with this conception is that it seems to assume
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that one's intention is relevant only at the
moment of acting.
time we act, apparently, we must have a relevant
intention.

Every

So,

if we

have some intention of doing an act at some
earlier time, we must

reaffirm

that intention by mentally picturing it at the
moment of

our action.

According to this conception we are like the little

train in the children's story who went around constantly
saying to

himself "1 think

can...

I

I

think

I

can...l think

1

can."

For one

to validly claim an intention of his to be in effect at
some time,
t,

he must be consciously conceiving it at t.

Again,

I

hardly think this is the way one's intention works.

Even though we oftentimes are not distinctly thinking of what we
intend while performing an action, when we are stopped and asked

what we intend to do we generally are able to give
sponse indicating

a

a

distinct re-

specific objective to which our act is directed.

Our intention to do something seems to be more along the lines of

disposition to do an act when certain circumstances obtain.
we intend at some earlier time to do an act at

certain circumstances obtain.

a

a

That is,

later time or when

When we find ourselves in those parti-

cular circumstances or notice that the proper time has arrived, we
are disposed towards doing the action without repeating our earlier

thought process.
A common instance where this "disposition to act" is not

specifically reflected on by the agent may be seen in the combat
training of soldiers.

A soldier is taught to react immediately in
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a

particular way to certain stimuli without pausing
to deliberate on

which action is appropriate.

For instance, soldiers are trained to

hit the dirt" whenever they hear weapons firing
in their vicinity.

They practice this response until it becomes

a

matter of habit.

Thus,

when they are shot at in actual combat, they will immediately
dive
for cover without having had a deliberate thought in the
form of in-

tending to dive for cover.

Nonetheless, if they are asked afterward

what they intended to do when they heard the gunfire, they will

undoubtedly respond with something like "I intended to hit the dirt"
or "I intended to dive for cover."

Still another difficulty with the view lies in the great emphasis
it places on the distinction between the agent's intent and the action

that results.

The action as it actually turns out is of secondary

moral importance if the agent has directed his intention in

acceptable manner.

a

morally

Whether an act is permissible is determined by

whether the agent's preceeding intent was good.

Now, if the agent's

intent is such an overriding factor in our morally judging the agent,

then why not make it the sole criterion?

The answer is obvious.

often have intentions which we do not fulfill.
us would be in dire straits, morally speaking,

solely on our intentions alone.

I

We

think that many of

if we were judged

Fortunately for us (and everyone

else) many of our bad intentions (as purely mental acts) never come
to fruition.

Moreover, most of us would not like to think that our

moral status depended solely upon our intentions alone, especially
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considering all the bad ones we have adopted at
some time or other.
A fourth worry with this view of intention
concerns the idea
that we must constantly maintain good intentions.

If we are always

conscious of our intention just before we act (as this
view supposes)
and are judged primarily upon our intention, we are
responsible for

any act in which we have had intentions.

So now we are acting in a

morally blameworthy manner if our intention is not good.

That is,

if we perform an act which on all other accounts is morally
permiss-

ible and yet our intentions are wrong, then we are acting wrongly.

Even if we agree that we should not be praised for such acts,

think

I

we would agree that we should not be adjudged as doing wrong either.

My final concern with this concept is the notion of "an intention

produced at will."

As we have already seen, according to this theory,

we are capable of "directing" our intentions towards morally suitable

results.

Now, if we are able to "direct" our intentions, then it

seems that this is an action requiring an intention also.

But, if

this is so, then it appears to be the case that we "intend to intend."

Moreover, it appears that these "intentions to intend" must be of the

morally suitable kind, (i.e., good ones).
then it is possible that we could have
intention.

a

However, if we accept this,
bad intention to have

On top of that, our bad intention in having

a

a

good

good inten-

tion would negate the goodness of the overall act.

There are really two problems expressed in this last worry.
The first concerns how intentions get initiated.

If intentions are
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interior acts of the mind which are willed (or
intended), then must
the second-order intentions in turn be
intended, and so on?
a

doubt, we are faced with

a

Without

possible infinite regression if we cannot

establish at what point our intention and, hence,
action is initiated.
The second problem stems for the first.

If we do have intentions

to intend,

and so on, with succeeding higher order intentions,
then

there is

problem in establishing which level of intention is

a

morally relevant.

For example, do we say the intention that

immediately causes the action is the intention to be judged?
it the intention to intend to act?

Or is it somehow

a

Or is

combination

of the two?
1

think it is fairly evident that these kinds of problems bring

about more confusion than assistance to the moral judgment of acts.

Because this particular view of intention leads to these kinds of
problems, we are probably safe in assuming that it is not correct.

Perhaps we ought to consider another view of intention that is held
by many.

A Humean Conception of Intention

Another concept that many people hold postulates that intention
is "nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscious

of when we knowlingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or

new perception of our mind."
is also problematic.

20

This conception, articulated by Hume,

As with the first conception of intention men-
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tioned, there seems to be an assumption
that we always have an

occurrent intention whenever we perform an
intentional act.

notion is worrisome for the reasons

1

This

have already mentioned.

A more important trouble with this concept is
that it seems
to render the causal connection between an act
and its intention

irrelevant.

Intention is

a

mere mental adjunct to physical action.

Hume seems to have believed that we could show no causal
relationship

between

a

person's intention and the subsequent action done to fulfill

that intention.

For him at least, an intention is merely something

that occurs cotemporaneously with the action.

To claim more than

this is to claim more than we can empirically substantiate.
If an agent's intention is, therefore, nothing but a mere "feel-

ing" accompanying the initiation of his action, then the agent may well

have an intentional feeling when he performs
good.

a

particular act that is

However, it is not clear that this intentional feeling plays

direct role in influencing the agent's action

a

So, one could argue it

is not a factor that bears on the moral worth of the action.

A Humean conception of intention, then, undermines the PDF in
subtle way.

Because we cannot make the strict claim that an agent's

intentions generate his actions, we may be forced into
to what role,

of actions.

a

if any,

a

quandary as

intentions should play in our moral evaluation

For whatever intention the agent may have had preceding

the action, good or bad, we cannot say that it was that intention that

triggered the action.
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We can see that if this is true, then the
distinction between

foresight and intention which is so crucial to the
PDE virtually disappears.

The difference between an agent’s intending good
consequences

and merely foreseeing bad consequences becomes a
matter of the agent's

attitude towards what he envisions will be the potential
consequences
of his action.

The intended consequence is the foreseen one which

the agent desires and, as a result, places
on.

a

special mental emphasis

If this is the case, then it seems that all we have to do is

properly align our "intentional attitude" with the morally acceptable consequence (s ) that we foresee as resulting from our action.

Since the most we can say under this Humean conception of intending
is that there is an "association" between a person's intention and

the resultant action, all a person has to do is make sure that he has
the proper intentional feeling associated with his action.
is then morally permissible regardless of what he does.

this view of intention is as undesirable as the one

viously.

I

His action

Clearly,

discussed pre-

In divorcing the agent's action from his intention, it

makes morality

a

mental exercise.

Aune and Intention as

a

"Disposition to Act"

While these theories are clearly problematic, we should not yet
give up hope of making sense of the notion.

A more recent and plausible

view has been presented by Bruce Aune in his book Reason and Action
His ideas on intention are as follows:

.
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We have to learn to think in conceptual
terms
and in learning this we develop propensities
to
behave (verbally and otherwise) in ways appropriate
for various thoughts.
Part of what is involved in
learning to think in a volitional way is that we
develop a propensity to make appropriate movements
in response to thoughts like ”1 will now do such
and such.
Thus, the words "I will now raise my
hand" may run through our minds but if they do not
trigger off a propensity to move our hand in the
required way, they will not express, for us, the
relevant volitional thought.

For Aune

,

then,

intentions are to be thought of as propensities to

speak and act in particular ways that are in accordance with certain

intentional thoughts.

As we proceed through life we learn that

certain behaviors are appropriate for particular circumstances.
learn that doing

a

particular action in

bring about certain results.

a

We

set of circumstances will

If the results are those that are

acceptable for us or perhaps even desirable, then we infer that this

behavior will be appropriate in the future.
conceptualize in

a

The individual learns to

particular set of circumstances that it is correct

for him to try to do

a

particular act or manifest certain behavior.

Thus, if he finds himself in that particular set of circumstances he

will tend to conclude that he will do the appropriate act at that time.
That, in turn, usually prompts the appropriate movements needed to

perform the act.

The relation of intention with action is, then,

causal one; but one of selective causality.

Not all intentions trigger

action and not all action is set off by intentions.
following way:

a

Aune says this the
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...belief and intentions are best thought
of as
propensities to think certain things or to
use
certain premises, and a simple pattern of
reasoning involving thoughts appropriate to
both beliefs
and intentions is this:
If we have the premises
"I will do A in C" and "I am now in
C," we will
tend to conclude "I will now do A”
the transition from. .complex thoughts to the appropriate
movements, may be viewed causally:
the premises
prompt the volitional conclusions, and the
volitional conclusion triggers off the movements.
There i^2thus a causal chain from thought to
.

.

.

.

action.

The important point to remember here is that in order
for this chain
of reasoning to obtain, the agent must believe both
that he is in
the appropriate circumstances to do his act and that
his doing the act

will bring about the state of affairs he desires.

It is my opinion

that much of the trouble with the PDE lies in trying to justify
these

beliefs

.

One

s

intent is inextricably linked with his beliefs about

the world around him and his relation to other things in it.

later section of this paper

I

In

a

will discuss this dicey problem of

applying the appropriate beliefs and perceptions one has about the
world while at the same time trying to determine if they are, in fact,
accurate.

As one might well imagine this is a problem of monumental

proportions in war.

Two Uses of the Term "Intention"

In the foregoing discussion

two different ways.

I

I

have used the term "intention" in

think it is best at this point to look at the

distinction between the two uses of the term.

One way we use the term
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IS to refer to an agent's mental
state.

In everyday language we

often say "Yes, he had the intention of doing
something."

When we

employ the term in this way we are marking an
agent's mental state.
We are saying nothing about what the mental
state is directed toward.

The other way we use the term is to denote the
object of the

agent

mental state.

s

intended as
say,

a

We use it in this sense to refer to what is

result of the agent's action.

For instance, we might

"Captain Jones' intention, in positioning his company at
battle

position "Trasimene," was to ambush and destroy an enemy armored
column."

In this sentence we are talking about the object of the

agent's action, the state of affairs the agent desires to bring about,
not his mental state.

It is important that we do not confuse these

two uses of the term.

Generally speaking, when

I

use the term

I

mean

to express the object of the agent's action.

Intention as

a

Relativized Notion

There are other relevant points about the notion of intention
that

I

think need to be discussed before continuing.

grasp them for our discussion later.

We will need to

The first point is that it often

makes more sense to talk of an agent's intention in an action (as the
object of his mental state) with respect to
sequences, and

a

set of circumstances.

best understood as

a

relativized notion.

consider the sentence "John intended."

a time,

desired con-

In other words, it is often

To see why it is, let's

This sentence certainly
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tells us little if anything at all about
John.^^

One might think

It says something about a particular
feeling that John had.

seems to me that

1

But, it

do not have the same "feelings," or even
the same

kind of feeling each time

1

intend something.

state and physical sensations differ each time

That is, my emotional
1

have an intention.

So, this sentence probably does not report a
feeling that John has.

What does it report?

Your guess is as good as mine.

Nevertheless,

in examining this sentence we can see that the word
"intends" has
a

much clearer meaning when used to refer to an intentional object.

The sentence,

John now intends to join the army on his eighteenth

birthday" is much more helpful, because it puts John’s intention in
a

referential context.
To be perfectly clear when we discuss a person's intention,

then,

it is useful to specify what action the person intends, the

time he intends the action, and the relevant conditions that apply
to the situation.

Our knowing what action the agent thinks he is

intending to perform gives us an idea what act should follow and
frame of reference to judge his act.

a

It tells us something about

what the agent expected to do and perhaps allows us to infer something about the kinds of acts he did not want to do.

For example,

suppose Captain Jones says to us "I intend to trap and annihilate
the approaching armor column."

It seems reasonable (taking this

sentence at face value wthout considering the surrounding circumstances or the time at which it was intended) to infer that Captain
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Jones does not expect that his own unit
will be defeated.

Moreover,

we may reasonably infer that the enemy
column is not composed of non-

combatants.

Practically speaking, we can tell

a

great deal about how

Captain Jones envisions what he is doing and the
results he wishes to
obtain.

Moreover, we can tell

a

great deal more about what he does

and does not intend to do.

The notion of time is also very important.

Many intentional acts

only make sense to us if we know when they are intended.

For example,

it would have made no sense for President Truman to
have said in 1940,
"I

intend to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima."

At that time the bomb

had not been developed and, so far as we know, Truman had no
idea that

such a bomb could be developed.

He first learned of its existence in

the spring of 1945, only a few months before he gave the actual order
to use it.

Besides, it is reasonable to assume that he vacillated

before he finally decided to use the bomb.

As in this case, we need

to know when an individual had an intention before we evaluate it.

Whether the agent's description of the act he intends is consistent with relevant circumstances also plays an important role in
our understanding what an agent's intention is at

a

particular time.

The circumstances serve either to justify or invalidate the agent's

claim to have such-and-such an intention.

To see this, let's consider

the case in which a soldier says, "I intended to shoot that enemy

soldier in self-defense."

Normally we would say that this is

a

reasonable way to describe the actions of soldiers participating in
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combat.

But, if the enemy soldier was in the act
of surrendering, or

if he was lying on the battlefield seriously
wounded, we would be much

less inclined to describe the intention that way.

We have now seen that an agent's intention is
more clearly under-

stood when relativized to the factors

I

have mentioned.

These rela-

tivizing factors, however, are not the only considerations
relevant
in considering an agent's intention.

that plays an important role.

There is still another factor

When we discuss an agent's action, we

normally try to consider what options were available to him at the
time he made his choice and committed himself to his chosen action.
At almost any time an agent has a number of relevant alternatives

available, each of which is performable by him.

On many occasions

the agent either is not aware of all these alternatives or does not

perceive them all as being performable.
based upon

a

An agent's intention is

choice to perform one action instead of the others that

he perceives open for him to do.

We will doubtless want to consider

his intended act not only in relation to some absolute standard of

right and wrong but also in light of what the agent thought he could
have done otherwise.

One's intention is

a

matter of choice.

A

deontologist attempts to determine what all the relevant performable
acts open to him are.

He then tries to determine which of the possible

actions are morally right.

That is, he determines which of his actions

in terms of their consequences do not violate the moral rules he

accepts.

The one or ones that do not violate these rules are per-

missible acts, acts morally open for him to intend to perform.
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Some Epist emological Considerations
of Intention

I

have been sidestepping an important
issue for quite awhile now.

All along

I

have been talking about "relevant"
circumstances, "relevant"

alternatives and the like.

What

things relevant for the agent.

I

have not said is what makes these

The success an agent has in making

moral choices will be limited by the way he
perceives the situation
and the actions open to him.

We can put these perceptions and beliefs

that the agent entertains into three general
categories.

They are

(1) beliefs about the circumstances the agent is in and the
correct-

ness of the intended action for those circumstances,

(2) beliefs of

the agent about his ability to perform the intended action
and bring

about the intended consequences of it, and (3) beliefs about
potential

consequences occurring other than those intended.

Let's turn to the

first of these categories.

When an agent is in

a

position to make moral choices, he generally

tries to evaluate the circumstances he is in and ascertain what courses
of action are available to him.

Once he has completed these prelimin-

aries, he determines which acts are relevant for the situation and

then decides which of these are morally appropriate for the accomplish-

ment of the consequences that he intends to bring about.

Now, it is

fairly evident that different people may, and often do, perceive the
same situation in different, even radically different, ways.

An

important factor is what evidence and which facts are readily available to the agent.

Certainly one's cognizance or ignorance of critical

.
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information will play an important role in
one's decision-making
process
Not all individuals have the same access to
relevant information
in a given situation.
of factors.

This difference may be attributed to any number

There may not be enough time to collect and digest
all

the relevant information.

ability is limited.

Perhaps an individual's data collecting

Maybe the individual's ability to analyze the

given information is hampered due to his own intellectual
limitations.

Perhaps there are external factors which limit his evaluat-

ing this data effectively and completely.

These limitations are compounded by an individual's natural pre-

disposition towards evaluating raw data in

a

biased manner.

One's

cultural indoctrination, ideology, religion, past experience, and

previous moral and professional training will all play an important
role in influencing the agent's understanding and evaluation of a

given situation.

So,

I

think it is fair to say that there are many

factors which preclude the agent's making completely unbiased and

objective evaluations with respect to any given situation.

Assuming that each of our perspectives on the world is slanted by
different sociological, experiential and environmental factors, it is
not surprising that different persons may describe the same situation
in different terms, different enough to influence their understanding

of what alternatives are open to them, and perhaps even the determina-

tion of which action they choose.

One can well imagine that these
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factors play

a

critical role in the perceptions of those
leaders of

warring nations who are faced with making
moral decisions.

Moreover,

It IS fairly easy to see why different
nations may view the same

incidents in radically different ways.
A second type of belief which is critical in
an individual’s

intent is his belief about the performability of the
course of action
he chooses and how likely it is that his performing
it will bring about

the ends he intends.

Once again the agent's training, past experience,

innate resourcefulness, his ability to predict realistically
and account
for how external influences will affect his action, and his
ability to

evaluate realistically his own capabilities will all play

a

role in

his determining whether he beleives he is capable of accomplishing the

task at hand. Remember, the agent must believe he is capable of doing
the action in terms of how he envisions it when he is considering his

alternatives.

If the alternative he chooses is described as,

for

example, "destroying the enemy's main manufacturing center without

killing

a

large number of innocent civilians," then the action he

believes he can perform must fit the description above.

The agent

must believe his act is performable, as he describes or envisions it.
Thus, if the agent believes that he cannot perform the act under this

description, then he believes that it is not an alternative available
to him.

It is important to note here that whether or not the agent is

actually capable of accomplishing the action is not the critical issue.
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The agent

upon his

s

decision and subsequent intention to do the
act is based

^lief

that

a

certain state of affairs will obtain as

of his doing that act.

result

a

It may well happen that the agent believes
he

is capable of performing the act when,

in fact, he is not.

Conversely,

he may believe that he is unable to perform the
act and yet, in

actuality, be able to do it.
In the last category of beliefs are those that have to
do with

potential consequences of the act that are not intended.

when an agent considers

a

Generally,

potential act he tries to determine what

the consequences of this act might be.

apparent while others are not.

Some consequences are readily

The agent will be able to foresee with

reasonable certainty that certain conseqeunces will occur while others

may be less probable or even just barely possible.

It is fairly clear

as a general rule, that the agent will tend to place greater emphasis

on the consequences he foresees as more certain and pay less attention
to those consequences which are less probable or only possible.

instance, suppose that
soldier.

soldier intends to shoot his rifle at an enemy

a

Let's also suppose that he is an excellent marksman.

ever he fires at

a

target, he usually hits it.

misses the enemy soldier with his first shot.
a

nearby rock and kills

For

a

When-

Today, however, he
The bullet ricochets off

civilian passing nearby.

In this case it is farily clear that the probability of the

soldiers' killing the civilian in the way he did was very low, cer-

tainly much lower than his chances of shooting the enemy soldier.
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Moreover, it would seem reasonable to say
that when the soldier fired
his rifle, he envisioned that the enemy
soldier would be shot as

direct result of his action, not the civilian.

a

So it seems that the

relative probability of the potential consequences
plays an important
role here.

Generally speaking, we intend those consequences
which we

believe will be direct consequences of our action
and which we believe
are likely to occur as a result of our action.

results of our actions as

I

beliefs into our intention.

If we perceive the

have stated, then we incorporate those

That is, we commonly think that the

intended consequences of an agent's action are (1) foreseen
bv him
and (2) believed by him to be a direct result of his action.
I

should point out here that there are various problems with the

conception of intention

1

have portrayed above.

One major question

has to do with whether an agent's belief that a foreseen consequence
is certain and a direct result of his action is a necessary and suffi-

cient condition for that consequence to be intended by him.

We might

well agree that it is necessary for an agent to believe his intended

consequence is likely to occur as

a

result of his act.

In addition,

we would probably agree that it is necessary for him to believe the

intended consequence stems directly from his action.
clear that these beliefs do not constitute
intent.

a

Yet, it is fairly

sufficient condition for

To see this we need only consider the following example.

Let us suppose that our Captain Jones is given the mission of

moving his tank company from position A to position

B.

Unfortunately,
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this mission requires Jones to cross farmer
Williams'

corn field.
for the year.

freshly planted

This will in all probability ruin Williams'
corn harvest
We will also suppose that this unpleasant
consequence

is foreseen by Jones as a likely direct
result of performing his

mission to move his tank company to position
Williams

field across

rugged mountains.

B.

Moreover, let's set

valley floor in between two very steep and

a

These mountains are so steep that Jones and his

tank company cannot go around the field:

they must traverse it.

About five minutes later Jones' battalion commander calls him
on the
radio and tells him that he must move his company to position
B

immediately and prepare

a

defensive position to block an enemy

penetration.

Now the question is whether Jones' belief that the field will

probably be destroyed as an immediate consequence of his action is
sufficient for us to say that he intends to destroy the crops and

thereby ruin farmer Williams' harvest.

It seems that his intending to

cross the field in the pursuit of accomplishing his mission is quite

a

different thing from his intending to destroy the farmer's crops even
if that is a direct result of the action.

beliefs

I

It seems to me that the

have attributed to Jones are not sufficient enough to con-

stitute his intending to destroy the field.

Of course, it may be correct

to say that Jones has not intended not to destroy the field.

Jones'

failure to intend that the field is not destroyed does not entail,
however, that he intended the field to be destroyed.
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Intentio n and the Problem of Agent Control
in Actions

Another problem we encounter when discussing
the notion of intent
is the degree of control the agent has in
bringing to bear the action

and resultant consequences he intends.

There are those actions which

the agent has the physical power to bring about
without the assistance
of other actors.

The agent in these actions has immediate voluntary

control over what he does with his own body and how those
bodily

motions result in the action.

For example, if Captain Jones intends

to drive his own tank to position B,

immediate voluntary control

He uses his own physical movements to

manipulate the controls of the tank.
driving to position

then his action is under his

This in turn brings about his

B.

Not all results that agents intend are under their immediate control.

Whether the intended result obtains sometimes depends, at least

in part, on the contributory actions of other individuals.

In the case

of Captain Jones, we would say that although he intends full well to

move his company to position B, he cannot do this by himself.

He is

dependent on his subordinates' responses to his order and on how well
they carry it out.

Many actions in combat are cases in which the

intending agent's control over the outcome of the situation is much less
than optimal.
ent upon

a

In this sort of intending the agent's action is depend-

number of "sub-actions" performed by other agents who each

has his own intents and beliefs about the overall situation and the

nature of his own "subaction."

When this type of situation occurs, it
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IS far more difficult to assess the
resultant action and consequences

with regard to the primary agents' intent.
This problem is complicated further in those
cases where an

agent

s

intended action is based upon an expected response
by an

opponent whose own intent is to thwart that action.

Commanders in

combat are constantly faced with this type of situation.
an overall plan that they intend to put into action.

They have

The plan's

successful execution is dependent upon how well the commander's
subordinates follow the plan.

In addition, the plan's success depends

upon whether the enemy responds in the way the commanders have
envisioned.

A problem in any of these three areas may directly affect

both the agents intended action and its consequences.
more to say about this after

I

I

will have

have discussed the notion of fore-

seeability in greater detail.

The Notion of "Bare" Intentions

There is one final point about intention that
take up at this time.

I

would like to

We often say that there is a difference between

an agent's intention in an act he is performing or has performed and
his intention in a potential action that he may perform in the future.
In the first case the agent's intention has a direct causal relation to

the action and its consequences.

However, there is no such relation-

ship in the second case because the agent's intention is as yet un-

realized.

Is this a critical distinction?

And if so, what should we
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make of it?
think, first of all, that if we consider an
intention

I

pensity to act in

a

certain way, given

a

a

pro-

certain set of circumstances,

then we have to consider both intentions in
occurrent actions and
intentions for hypothetical future situations as bona
fide intentions.
It seems to me that a major concern with the
PDE is how intention

relates to actions.

The agents' performance of an intended action and

its results are what we are trying to determine as
either permissible

or impermissible.

This being the case, we might have a tendency to say

that an intention to act in some future situation has no moral
worth

until that situation is actualized.

This is an assumption which might

lead to some serious philosophical problems.

One thing that concerns me with this idea is that there is

a

great

deal of similarity between unrealized intentions concerning the future
and current intentions not to perform actions.
is no change in the agents'

In both cases there

behavior that we can point to.

The

agent's intention may have produced no overt physical action.

In both

cases the agent may in no way influence the action going on around him.

willing non-participant, so to speak (at least for the moment).

He is

a

Yet

think that there are occasions when we do not act and yet

I

behave in
a

a

morally impermissible manner.

situation where

another unit.

a

soldier comes across

24

a

For instance, consider

wounded soldier from

Let's suppose that the wounded soldier has been shot

in the leg and is bleeding profusely.

Prompt first aid will stop the
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bleeding and possibly save the wounded soldier’s
life.

On the other

hand, if the soldier is allowed to continue
bleeding, he may well die.

Our soldier. Private Smith, knows how to treat
the wound correctly and
exposes himself to no risks if he gives first aid
to the wounded
soldier.

Would we say that it is impermissible and blameworthy
for

Smith to pass on without giving the wounded man first
aid?
so.

1

think

Even though Smith might do no further harm to the
soldier, we

would say that in this case that Smith's inaction is wrong.

If Smith

intends not to act in this case and passes on, then he is morally
culpable.

We would probably say he is obligated to help the wounded

soldier in this case.

That is, he morally ought to act.

Now it seems to me that if intentions not to act can be morally
wrong, they can also be morally right.

Hence, intentions which result

in no change of behavior may have moral worth.

In a similar manner,

intentions for contingent future situations

also have moral worth.

For example, the stated or inferred intentions of one person may well
influence the behavior of another person, even though there is no

apparent physical cause-and-ef feet relationship.

theory is based upon this possibility.

In fact, deterrence

Even though the United States

has never used any nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union, our

expressed intention to do so should certain Soviet actions obtain has

apparently prevented the Soviet Union from using their arsenal of nuclear
weapons thus far.
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So it seems, in one sense anyway, that "bare"

intent can have moral worth both in the case of intention for future
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contingent acts and intentions not to act
(or act omissions).
As we have seen in this somewhat lengthy
discussion, the concept

of intention has many aspects which complicate
our evaluation of it in

actual situations.

Closely tied to the notion of intention is the

concept of foreseeability.

We have already touched upon it somewhat

because it is almost impossible to talk of intention
without also

considering it.

In the next chapter

I

will discuss the notion of

foreseeability in greater detail and also consider some of
the
factors of combat, and gaming strategy which have an effect
on

soldier

s

a

ability to clearly foresee the consequences of his actions.

Essential to this discussion will be my attempt to identify some confusions in distinguishing an act from its consequences.
mind, let's turn to the concept of foreseeability.

With that in

CHAPTER

III

FORESIGHT

Foresight and Belief

As

I

have already implied, the notion of foresight is
rather

difficult to come to grips with.
a

special variety of belief.

It seems to me that foresight is

However, it is belief not about current

states of affairs but instead states of affairs likely
to occur in
the future.

More specifically, the agent believes that because

certain state of affairs is now true,

a

a

certain other state of affairs

will obtain at some future time.
In having a foresight, the agent must make certain inferences

from the knowledge, beliefs, and perceptions he currently holds.
He generally bases his inferences on his observations of similar

situations that have occurred in the past.
affairs occurs under

a

If a certain state of

particular set of circumstances, then the

agent will tend to believe that similar results will occur as have

occurred in similar situations in the past.
part of this process is to insure one is in

Of course the tricky
a

suitably similar set

of circumstances so that he may be justified in making the inference.
In fact, the agent must be able to determine the relevant aspects
of his current situation before he ever makes the comparison.

I

will argue later in this chapter that the inherent nature of combat
works against the agent's being able to assess accurately his own
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situation and, hence, against his making
an accurate forecast of
what will result from his action.

Foresight as

a

Relativized Concept

Before turning to that discussion, however, it
will be in our

interest to discuss some other relevant aspects
of foresight.
sight, like intention, is a relativized concept.

Fore-

First and foremost,

it must be understood as a term that has
meaning in relation to a par'

ticular individual.

In legal discussions we often hear phrases like

"what the common man would foresee" or "the judgment is
based upon

what

a

reasonable man would foresee."

concerned about what
situation.

a

In moral discussions we are

particular person actually does foresee in

a

We are concerned about his own particular foresight

(and intention) because it is his own foresight that directly bears

upon his action.

What

a

"reasonable man" would foresee in the same

action might not necessarily be the same thing as what any particular
individual does foresee.
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In fact,

I

think all of us can think of

occasions where the results of our actions were evident to almost

everyone but ourselves.

If we were wrong in the situation, we un-

doubtedly made clear the point that the obvious result everyone else
foresaw played no role in our decision, intention and action.

We did

not foresee that consequence.
One major reason why we often foresee consequences of an action

that other people do not is that we conceptualize our action differ-
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ently.

Our beliefs are about states of affairs which may
be en-

visioned and expressed in

a

multitude of different ways.

Since we

each cannot think of all these ways, it is not surprising
that we

often think of some situations differently.

For example, the following

two sentences might express the same situation.
£:

Sergeant Brown fired his tank at

a

suspected enemy head-

quarters building, destroying it.
q:

Sergeant Brown killed nine innocent civilians.

Clearly, in this case, how the act is described makes

difference to our moral attitudes about it.

a

great deal of

Brown's perception of the

states of affairs involved in this action is likely to be different
from that of a civilian observer standing near the building who, to
his horror, is aware that there are women and children in the building.
So there are really two considerations involved here.

concerns how the agent envisions his action.
of it affects his moral attitude toward it.

The first

How he genuinely thinks
The second consideration

is that the agent's conception of his act limits somewhat the con-

sequences he will foresee as stemming from it.

For example. Brown's

believing that he is firing on an enemy headquarters greatly limits
the reasonableness of the thought that nine innocent civilians will
die as a result.

From

a

moral point of view it may be helpful for an

agent to consider his action under several different descriptions.

Unlike one's intention, which is often focussed narrowly on one

particular consequence, one's foresight may include

a

whole range of
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consequences.

As

a

result, it seems to me that

better off with an active and vivid imagination.

a

moral agent is much

For then he is able

to consider the act itself under a greater
range of descriptions and

can thereby foresee more of the probable
consequences of his action.
The number and moral acceptability of the
probable consequences, other

than those intended, will play

a

major role in influencing the agent's

eventual action.
By the foregoing discussion

1

have not meant to imply that each

time before we perform an action we consider a whole list
of act des-

criptions that our act might fall under.

What we do instead is con-

sider as many of the circumstances which could play

action as we can.

a

part in our

We then try to envision what consequences would be

likely to occur from our doing the act under those circumstances.
is

It

in this way that we conceptualize the various states of affairs

which characterize our intended action and its probable consequences.

Foreseeability and Probability

The next point which should be discussed here is what constitutes

"probability" for the foreseen consequences of an act.

We know that

not all of the things we foresee are certain to occur.

Yet, on the

other hand, the consequences of our acts would not be foreseen if
they were not in some way believed by us to be likely to occur.

The

notion of foresight, then, connotes that what is foreseen is more
than

a

mere possibility.

There are grounds for us to believe that

a
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particular state of affaris is likely to happen.

One way this concept

has been expressed is that a state of affairs
is probable if and only
if it is epistemically possible and it is
more reasonable to risk

something of value on that state of affairs occurring
than to not
risk anything of value on its occurring.

Thus, when we say some

state of affairs is foreseen we are at least
reasonably confident
that it will occur.

An agent's foresight, as

beginning of this chapter, is
of affairs.

a

1

mentioned in the

special belief about

a

future state

So we should characterize foresight in terms of belief

about the future and the degree of reasonableness necessary for
the
act to be foreseen.

foreseen by

a

Accordingly, let's say

a

state of affairs is

person at some time if and only if that person believes

at that time it is at least probable for that state of affairs to occur

at some future time.

It is fairly easy to see,

state of affairs is also

a

special case of

a

then, that an intended

foreseen state of affairs.

An agent must foresee that the intended consequences are probable.
That is why he intends to do the act in the first place, to attain
that state of affairs.

The major difference between the two notions

then is that the agent in intending something must have an interest

vested in bringing about that particular state of affairs.

To fore-

see something, by contrast, the agent need not have an interest vested
in the foreseen consequence.

An intention is always foreseen, but

foreseeable state of affairs is not always intended.

a
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Factors Thst Biss One's Foresight

Earlier in this paper,

I

mentioned

a

number of sociological,

experiential and environmental factors which tend
to color each person's

perception of the world.
known facts is based to

What
a

a

person attempts to forecast from

very large degree on how these factors

have influenced the agent in the past.

Each of us has learned

a

particular set of cultural values, had different experiences
and
has been affected by different external environmental
factors.

for instance,

1

as an American army officer may well have a very

different outlook on the world than my Soviet counterpart.
the ideals

1

hold may be incompatible with his.

social system promotes
does.

So,

a

Many of

After all, the Soviet

different set of values than our system

In terms of education and occupational training, our backgrounds

may again differ.

It is fairly evident that because we each have

different perspectives on political and social issues, we will choose
our courses of action based on different criteria.
of our chosen actions will differ as a result.

Accordingly many

In addition, what

we foresee as relevant and important will differ somewhat.

Those

things which we each tend to emphasize will be more likely to be

considered as the immediate consequence of our actions than those
we do not consider important.
In wartime some of these factors take on even greater importance

than in peacetime.

External environmental factors and actions per-

formed by the enemy, in particular, are critical elements in our
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decision-making process.

Generally speaking, these two factors tend

to work against methodical, well-thought-out
plans of action.

It

is perhaps more difficult in battle to
foresee what exact consequences

our actions will produce than, say, in ordinary
day-to-day situations.

Moreover, it will be much more difficult in war to
fulfill our

intended actions as we would like them fulfilled.

main problem is that the enemy is acting in such

Of course, the
a

way as either to

thwart our intended actions or to deceive us about how our
intended

action will affect him.

That is, our opponents are not just passive

objects of our actions.

They are also trying to act on us.^^

war is

a

Hence,

series of moves and counter-moves in which each move of ours

is taken only after considering both the enemy's last move and the

next move we expect of him.

Foresight and Inductive Reasoning

Prediction or foresight is usually based on inductive reasoning.
We observe a certain activity for a period until we recognize

pattern emerge.

a

set

Then, we continue observing that pattern to reaffirm

that it recurs regularly.

If it does, then we feel justified in

asserting that if one thing in that type of pattern occurs, then
another related thing will occur.

tinually in our every day lives.
reasoning in war is as follows.

We use inductive reasoning conA common instance of inductive
We know enemy doctrine states that

the best time to attack is in the very early hours of the morning.
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say, between two and five o'clock.

Moreover, every enemy attack that

we know of has occurred in this general
time period.

Because we know

these two facts, we tend to infer that the
next time the enemy attacks
he will attack during that time period.

Consequently, we make it

a

point to be the most alert and prepared to
fight at that time.

Contributory Actions and Foresight
While we will agree that people tend to act in
certain general

patterns we cannot rely too much on this fact in combat.
IS apparent.

The reason

If the enemy always acted in the same way, we could

easily predict his actions and prepare ourselves to counter
them.
Our task of securing victory would be much simpler if our
enemies did
act in this way.

Unfortunately they do not because they are also well

aware of the disastrous consequences of their acting in
manner.

a

predictable

Accordingly they attempt, as we do, to vary their "tactical

behavior" and subsequently mislead or deceive us as to their true
intentions.

Moreover, they attempt to do everything in their power

to prevent our observance of them for any prolonged period.

They do

this, of course, to prevent us from obtaining enough data about their

activities to draw any accurate conclusions about them.
One of our objectives in war, then, is to vary our activity signi-

ficantly enough to prevent the enemy from inferring anything from it.
Our enemy, of course, will try to do the same thing.

Misleading

tactical moves, deceptive or encoded communications and other counter-

.
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feit activity play an extremely important
role in both strategic and

tactical planning.

Not only do we attempt to confuse the
enemy about

which of our actions are significant, but
also about how they are
significant
In actual combat, then, the enemy's
actions may pose a signifi-

cant problem for us in forecasting accurately
what will result from

our own actions.

Not only do we have to account for what the
enemy

IS currently doing, but also what he may
be doing in the immediate

future and also how he is responding or might respond
to our actions.

Foresight then becomes

a

matter of determining not only what the

enemy’s current actions are, but also what actions he
intends to perform in the future.

Looking at this from another perspective, we can

say not only that our actions have

a

direct effect on the enemy, but

also that how the enemy perceives our intention in the act
influences
his actions.

So when we perform an action which affects the enemy, it

is very often difficult to determine whether the consequences result

directly from our action alone or result from the enemy's response to
our action in conjunction with the act itself.

Clearly it is difficult

for anyone to foresee in some cases whether an agent's action directly

brings about the foreseen results.

Foresight and the Limitations of the Battlefield

So far we have been merely discussing foresight with respect to

strategy.

However, one's foresight is also affected by battlefield
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conditions.

These battlefield conditions affect the actions
of every-

one from the highest-ranking generals to the
lowest-ranking privates.

They affect

a

unit's communication, command and control structure,

and observation of the enemy.

If any of these three things is affected,

one's ability to plan and act is seriously impaired.

It must be

remembered that battlefield decisions are often made far from
the
actual engagement.

Moreover, many of the supporting weapons systems,

such as artillery, are fired without the benefit of being able to

observe the battlefield directly.

Accordingly, the correct appli-

cation of relevant battlefield information is dependent on whether
units engaged in the fighting accurately report the information, are

able to pass and receive the information, and finally put into affect
the resultant orders in the manner that they were intended.

easy to see that if there is

a

It is

breakdown anywhere along the line,

those people who make the decisions will have inaccurate or confused

perceptions of what, in fact, is going on.

Once their beliefs about

the situation becomes distorted, any attempt to predict accurately or

plan for the future becomes almost impossible.
then, that

a

commander's perception of

a

It is easy to see,

given situation may be

inaccurate and, thereby, may cause him to blunder with respect to both
the enemy and those civilians caught between his unit and the enemy.
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Time Limitations and the Factor of Stres
s
Still another limiting factor in

situation is the factor of time.
decisions are often required.

a

soldier's perceptions of

a

In the middle of combat rapid

The leader is not always blessed with

an unlimited amount of time to weigh all the
appropriate circum-

stances and consider all the possible alternatives.

The amount of

time available to make a decision may only be a
minute, if it is even
that long.

Moreover, the life-and-death decisions that are required

in combat situations place a considerable amount of
stress on the

decision maker.

Certainly the combination of stressful situations and

time constraints is not conducive to rational or well-thought-out
action.

It is not surprising,

then, that gross mistakes are made in

combat due to poor foresight.

Foresight and the Actions of the Innocent

Now you may be wondering what all this has to do with the unintentional, yet foreseen, killing of innocents in combat.

Well,

innocent people are often caught in the middle of military actions.

Sometimes they are there of their own volition and sometimes they are
not.

In some cases people refuse to leave their homes.

Their whole

life is centered around their homeland and, in particular their, village.
It is inconceivable for these people to leave these areas even though

they know they might be caught in the middle of

a

battle.

That is,

they take the risk of remaining in the danger zone even though, as

.
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they know, they may lose their lives.

On the other hand, other

innocent people may be overtaken by the action.

This is the case

with those who get caught in the initial attacks
of

a

war and those

who live near war-making industries in cities
well behind friendly
lines

The important point here is that, like our
adversary, innocent

people are sometimes in
to them.

a

position to control events and their relation

It is not as if they are always unaware that there
is a war

going on around them or that they are unable to remove themselves
from
the scene of fighting.

Like most agents, innocent persons also have

choices they can make in regard to the war.
to be where they are,
so.

In many cases they choose

knowing that there are inherent risks in doing

While they are innocent of war-making activity, they still have

contributed, in

a

way, to their being in a dangerous situation.

When

an innocent person chooses to continue to live two blocks from an
arms factory or an oil refinery, he may be running the obvious risk
of annihilation.

I

do not advocate the wholesale slaughter of women,

children and the elderly; but one must admit that their voluntary

presence on the battlefield may be

a

strong factor contributing to

their own harm.

Soldiers of one warring nation are able to influence the enemy's

activity and the actions of the civilian populace.

But they do not

make choices either for the enemy or for non-combatants.

something those individuals do for themselves.

That is
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The major thrust of this argument, then,
is that the soldiers of
one warring party are not the only actors
in the scenario.

always the case that one individual (say

a

It is not

soldier) performs an

action on another while that other person
passively allows himself
to be acted on.

Other people and external circumstances often
con-

tribute directly to an action or

state of affairs.

a

acting on others, they are acting in
our decisions.

a

While we are

way that also affects us and

The combination of the factors

1

have mentioned so

far may make it very difficult to foresee with any
degree of certainty

what will be the exact consequences of one's action in
combat.

Military planners, as well as soldiers on the ground, deal in the
world of probability.
certainty.

The probabilities they work with rarely approach

Even the simplest activity, such as pulling the trigger

on a rifle and attemtping to hit

target, is an action in which the

a

intended consequences may be foreseen, at best, as only probable.

The Problem of Distinguishing Acts and Their Consequences

We cannot complete our initial discussion of foresight without

touching upon the problem of distinguishing acts and consequences.
In talking about intending or foreseeing specific actions we pre-

suppose that all acts are "atomic" in nature.
suppose that all acts are atomic,

I

By saying that we

mean that we seem to think of acts

as being individual entities of a special sort which may be considered

independently of each other and that there is

a

clear delineation
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between each act and every other act.

We tend to treat the con-

tinuum of action as if it is easily divisible
into neat individual

parcels called acts.
and so on.

Act A is distinct and separable from Act
B

In order to speak about a particular
segment of action

we tend to treat that segment as

a

unique individual act.

It is

as if our mental and linguistic division of
action corresponds with

some actual dividing lines between acts.

While this view of action may be useful for us in our
normal discourse about the world, it does not capture the world the
way it really
IS.

The current controversy over the problem of act
individuation

makes this point quite obvious.

With this debate have come

a

number

of theories, all of which purport to tell us the definitive way
in

which we may delineate between different actions (and also between
actions and their consequences).
two general categories.

action which

I

These theories may be grouped into

In the first category are those theories of

call "unifier theories."^

them believe that actions (or events) are

The philosophers who espouse
a

basic ontological entity

and that they each can manifest a multitude of different descriptions.^^

For them actions are identical if and only if they have the same
causes and effects.
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The second major grouping includes those theories of action

which

I

call "multiplier theories."

3^

Those who have proposed these

theories believe that actions are not basic ontological entities.
Instead, what we refer to as actions (or act-tokens) are logical
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constructs.

That is, an action is some "act-property"
that is

exemplified by some object at some time.^^

An act-property, then,

IS a property which a specified agent
can exemplify.

An example of

such an act-property might be "loading the
howitzer" or "assaulting
the hill."

These are properties because they can be true of
some

person at some time.
Whenever one performs an act, he exemplifies at least
one property.

That property is expressed by

gerundial noun clause.

a

Accordingly, when Private Doe shoots his rifle he exemplifies
the

property of "shooting

a

rifle."

An act (act-token), then, is

ticular instantiation of an act-property by

specified time (or time interval).

a

a

par-

particular person at

a

Under multiplier theories two acts,

A and B are identical if and only if (1) the act property exemplified
in A is identical to that exemplified in B,

(2)

the agent of A is

identical to the agent of B, and (3) the time that A occurs is identical
to the time that B occurs.

In writing this paper
I

1

have assumed a "unifier" position.

While

recognize that there are some serious philosophical objections to

this position,

1

feel that it best exemplifies our natural intuitions

about the nature of action.

Moreover,

I

think that it is easier to

see some of the problems of relating intention to action using this

theory.

However,

I

feel that the problems

I

am about to point out

to a degree are applicable also to the "multiplier" position.

over, even though not all of the problems

I

More-

will bring up will be
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problems for "multiplier" theories, these
theories are beset by

set

a

of their own peculiar problems.

Let

now turn to the question of act individuation.

s

In order

to see why individuating between acts is
problematic, we might do well
to take a look at an example.

But first, let's consider the following

sentences which describe actions:
p:

Smith squeezed his trigger finger,

q:

Smith pulled the trigger,

r:

Smith shot Ivan,

s:

Smith killed Ivan.

How many actions are described here?

One?

Two?

Three?

Four?

It

is extremely difficult to answer this question without
knowing what

circumstances each of these sentences describes.

Surely these

sentences describe anywhere from one to four actions depending on the

situation they describe and how we look at the situation.
Let's suppose that the agent referred to in these four sentences
is the same

person and that the four sentences all apply to the follow-

ing vignette.

Private Smith is on watch one evening in his foxhole.

All of a sudden he hears

a

voice in front of him.

Immediately he peers

in the direction of the noise through his night-vision device.

Instantly he spots

a

figure and identifies him as an ememy soldier.

We will call this enemy soldier "Ivan."

From the nature of Ivan's

motions. Smith can tell that Ivan is not aware that he is being
observed.

Consequently, Ivan remains in the open making himself

a
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splendid target for Smith.

Smith slowly picks up his own rifle so as

not to make any noise himself and takes
careful aim at Ivan.

Once

he has Ivan in his sights, he squeezes his
trigger finger thereby

pulling the trigger and shooting Ivan.

Ivan dies

a

few short minutes

later.

Our first intuition is to claim that all four
sentences describe
the same act.

And, in a sense, we are right to do so.

Nonetheless,

there are some curious problems in making that assertion.

One thing

that might puzzle us is the relation between sentences
p and
example.

for

s,

While we might want to say that they both describe the same

state of affairs we also might have to admit, grudgingly, that
be considered a consequence of p.

s

could

That is. Smith's killing Ivan is

the direct result of his squeezing the muscles in his trigger finger
in this case.

Now, can we say that the consequence of an act is also

that same act?

This surely sounds absurd.

Nonetheless, we do not

want to claim that they are two separate acts.

For it is

in squeezing his trigger finger Smith killed Ivan.

about this?

fact that

What are we to say

Well, one thing we might say is that it does not make

clear sense to say that action over

neatly into

a

a

definitive set of acts.

a

continuum may be divided up
We only act for convenience as

In reality a segment of action we refer to as one act

if it could.

may well overlap with

a

segment of action we refer to as another act.

The relation between sentences p through p seem to indicate this.
As a result,

I

think that it is fairly safe to conclude that no

66

act" is completely separable from every
other "act."

Hence, it

is dangerous to assume that individual
acts are atomic entities.

We use the notion of "act", then, as an
arbitrary and artificial

delineator" to talk about particular aspects of an
individual's overall action.

It is more convenient to talk about a person's
action in

terms of specific properties which may describe
it at a particular time
or in terms of propositions which describe the states
of affairs of

which the actions are

a

part.

It is readily apparent that a particular

action or state of affairs can be described in

perhaps even in an infinite number of ways.

a

multitude of ways,

Perhaps any action can

be described in a way that would make it seem morally right (per-

missible) under that description.

Perhaps we could describe the

very same action in terms that make it seem morally unacceptable.
Our problem now is twofold.

First, we must decide which of the

act descriptions are morally relevant and important.

Second, we must

know if we are considering all of the morally relevant act descriptions.

Concerning future actions, we must decide which descriptions

of the action in terms of potential foreseeable results are probable

and also morally relevant.

While we can foresee to

a

degree what

consequences will result, we are not always aware which are the most

probable or morally relevant.

Throughout the course of history there have been actions and
events of such magnitude and far-reaching effects that it is difficult
to assess them morally at all.

Should we judge these events in terms
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of the more immediate consequences which
resulted from the action or
in terms of the more far-reaching
consequences which we are aware of

today?

There have been any number of these events
where the immediate

moral consequences were bad while the long-term
moral consequences

may have been good and vice versa.

The point

1

am trying to make is

that it is difficult to determine at which point
in time it is fair
to judge the act.

Do we judge the act in terms of (1) what is fore-

seen beforehand as probable, or (2) what is observed as
an immediate

result or (3) what is observed as

residual consequence some time

a

later?
It seems to me we run into great problems when we begin to

classify an action in terms of its consequences.

In our example

above, sentence r not only describes the same action as
p but also

incorporates the consequences of doing p into the description.
same relation holds between p and p.

The

Our doing this makes it easy for

us to take the basic physical movement Smith makes and describe this

action in the terms of its consequences.

The problem here is to

determine at what point it is no longer reasonable to describe Smith's
action in terms of its consequences.

In certain cases we seem to beg

the question that an action is wrong by describing it in perjorative
terms.

Now this may be ultimately

a

correct description of the action

in terms of what information we have about the action after it occurs.

However, it does not seem correct to me to claim that such

a

description

applies to the foreseen act unless the relation between the two des-
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criptions IS analytic and the agent is aware
that they are.

The fact

that a description may probably apply to
one's act in the future depending on what, in fact, occurs is not

a

sufficient condition for us to

say that it is appropriate to describe that
act in that particular way
at the earlier time.

We can see this more clearly if we consider the
following example.

Suppose Sergeant Williams fires an antitank missile at
2000 meters in the distance.

a

target some

There is an enemy position located at

the target, but the target is in the midst of

a

populated village.

If

there are any civilians in the general vicinity of the target,
they

will in all likelihood be killed or seriously injured when the missile
impacts on the target.
ability.

Let's assume that Williams foresees this prob-

Nonetheless, at the time he fires the missile Williams does

not consider his act

a

"killing of innocent civilians."

In fact, the

correctness of this description is contingent on several factors which
are beyond Williams'

control.

First, innocent people must wander

into a location close enough to his target to be hurt.

missile must hit the target and detonate upon impact.
target must explode in such

a

Second, the
Third, the

way as to kill any innocent bystanders.

If all three of these conditions are met, then Williams will have

killed some innocent people but he will not have foreseen that killing

innocent people is

a

concommitant of firing the missile system.

Now we know from our earlier discussion that some deontologists
are committed to saying that particular actions are wrong because
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they conflict with some general prohibition
against acts that produce consequences of a certain kind.

Now, if the deontologist

judges Williams' action at the time he fires the
missile, he cannot
say that Williams has violated any moral
prohibitions.^^

For him to

say that Williams' action is wrong, he must say
that Williams' action
is

killing innocent people."

But, he cannot say the act of "firing

the missile" is wrong because it has not produced the
bad consequences
of killing innocent people yet.

Instead, he must say that the act of

"firing the missile" is wrong because it is the same act as
"killing
the innocent people."
liiitil

Yet, it is not clear the two are the same act

the deaths occur as a result of the missile's impacting on the

target.

Clearly, then, an act that seems morally permissible under

one description becomes wrong only when it can be described as wrong

under another description.

Williams' act, however, does not seem to

be wrong at the time he fires the missile because there seems to be
no correct description of his act at that time which makes it wrong.

"Overall" Actions and "Act-Components"

There is another curious relationship between an action and its
consequences.

Once we describe an act in terms of its consequences,

that act becomes an "act-component" of the newly described act.

In

our example "Williams' firing the missile" becomes an act-component
of "Williams'

killing innocent people."

act has innumerable act-components.

If we think about it, every

Now, do act-components carry the
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same moral worth as the overall act
they are a component of?

would think they should.

One

However, as we have seen, we are often

confused about whether we should assign
the same moral worth to them
or not.

For it all depends at what point in the
agent's continuum of

action that we make the evaluation.

Moreover, to make the evaluation

IS to make a moral evaluation on a
segment of an agent's overall action

without considering its causes and, in turn,
its effects.

We fail to

consider it in relation to the overall continuum
of action as

a

whole.

Deontologicalism and Consequences

Of course, foresight is merely the consideration of
the truth of
a

possible state of affairs at

a

particular time in the future.

To

consider that state of affairs is to isolate it from all others

which describe the action.

The agent isolates that state of affairs

in the sense that he morally evaluates it independently of the other

states of affairs which might apply to the same situation.
sense, the deontologist is

a

consequentialist in

a

So,

in a

bizarre way.

In-

stead of considering some basic action and trying to weigh all of the

possible consequences of that action as does
considers all of the consequences of

might be incorporated into

a

a

a

utilitarian, he instead

simple physical action which

correct description of that same act and

then checks to see which of these act descriptions are such that the
act under that description violates his moral rules.
be described in terms of any of its consequences in

If the act can
a

way so that the

.
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act can be said to violate a moral rule,
then the act is wrong and

impermissible.

Hence, for a deontologist consequences
are important,

but only insofar as they affect the act
description.

One way of

looking at deontologicalism, then, is that an
act is permissible
until we are able to describe it as an act
which violates

a

moral

rule

Seen in this light, we can begin to see one major
problem with

deontological theories which will also provide troubles
for the PDE.
Almost any act we can think of can probably be described
in such

way that we would think it to be wrong under that
description.

a

To

demonstrate this problem let's consider an action which we
would

normally consider innocuous.
digging

a

foxhole.

Suppose Corporal Allen is in the act of

He is merely shoveling dirt out of a hole in the

ground to prepare his fighting position.

Now most of us would probably

say that there is nothing wrong with this action.

employed as
minal.

a

However, Allen is

mercenary in an army which fights for

a

known war cri-

In fact, while Allen has committed no atrocities himself,

other soldiers in other units of the same army have.

The cause for

which the army Allen is fighting is unquestionably unjust and Allen
knows this.

Now we could describe Allen's actions in the following

way:
t:

Allen is contributing to

u:

Allen is willfully failing to stop atrocities.

a

morally unjust cause.

Under these descriptions Allen is acting wrongly by digging the fox-
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hole. Yet,

I

think we are at least hesitant in this
case to say that

Allen’s action is morally wrong.

While we would have to agree that

t

and u are consequences of his digging the
foxhole, we would not want to
say that their incorporation into the act
description has any bearing
on the moral worth of digging the foxhole.

Single Agency versus Collective Agency

Having examined only acts that have

a

single agent, we can see

that complex actions in which more than one agent is
involved will be

just as problematic.

These actions can be difficult to assess because

it IS difficult to establish agency for the action and
its resultant

consequence.

Is one agent the agent of the overall action or is the
OO

collective group the agent?

within

a

If we say that a particular agent

group effort is responsible for the action, then we must

claim that his sub-action is key in the overall action.
is not always so.

But this

It may be that if some other individual failed to

perform his sub-action, then the overall action would not occur.

So,

it would not be correct in these cases to attribute agency to a single

individual.

However, on the other hand, if we attribute some sort of

collective agency to the group then we must consider how this collective
agent "foresees" and "intends" acts.

I

contend that what each indi-

vidual intends or foresees as a result of the action he contributes

may well be very different from his fellow contributors.

with several intentions in just one overall action.

We are faced

In light of this.
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It does not seem to make much sense to talk
about collective foresight

and intention.
In a collective action the matter of determining
which descrip-

tions of the action are morally relevant is greatly
exacerbated.

For

now we are not merely concerned with each of the individual's
perceptions about his relation to his own sub-action under any
number of
act descriptions which apply to it, but are also concerned
with his

perception about the relation of his sub-action to the overall-action,
his perception about the nature of the other contributing agents'

sub-

actions to the overall action, and his beliefs what the sub-actions
entail as opposed to what the overall action entails.

It is fairly

obvious that these factors make application of the PDF extremely

complex and difficult.

For each of the contributing agents can and

probably do have different beliefs about the nature of their own
actions, their fellow contributor's actions and the overall action
in general.
I

will discuss these problems in greater detail in the next

chapter.
war,

I

By the use of several fairly common examples of action in

intend to show that the PDF is unhelpful in deliberating

whether these actions are right or wrong.

We will see that under the

PDF, seemingly innocuous acts can be shown to be morally wrong and

heinous crimes can be shown to be permissible.

problems now.

Let's consider these

CHAPTER

IV

SOME BASIC PROBLEMS FOR THE PDE

A Short Review

We have already seen that it is difficult
to discuss the notions
of intention and foreseeability without
understanding something of the

problems with action theory and the limitations
of human perceptions.
In this chapter

I

intend to show how these two factors combine
to make

It difficult for us to make much sense of
the PDE.

Depending on how

we understand the relation of intention and
foresight to action, we

may come away with moral conclusions which run contrary
to our most
basic intuitions.

Some acts which we normally would consider wrong

come out, according to the PDE, as permissible whereas
some acts we

normally consider permissible are according to it, quite wrong.

More-

over, if we attempt to remove the ambiguity from this doctrine we

find that either the doctrine is so strict that virtually no act in

war is permissible or it is so loose that almost any act in war may
be deemed permissible provided that the agent has

a

"good intention"

and that the good consequences compensate for the bad consequences.
So far we have considered some important aspects of foresight

and intention which play an important role in our moral decisions.
First, we have been concerned about how the agent perceives

situation.

a

We know he has certain beliefs about what his action is

and what will be its consequences.
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We also know that these beliefs
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are limited by any number of external
factors to include the agent's

physical environment and the actions of
other agents.

The consequences

of an agent's action can be foreseen,
but foreseen with less than full

certainty.

Essentially, the same limitations apply to
the notion of

intention.
A second important consideration in applying
the PDE is that of
time.

We are concerned not only with how much
time an agent has to

decide and then act in

a

given situation, but also with the time in

the action continuum at which the agent has his
intentional attitudes.

Time places limitations on an agent's decision-making
capability and
it plays an important role in determining what
intention is

appropriate for what action.
Third, how the agent envisions or describes the intended
action
or foreseen consequences is an important factor in determining
if the

action is morally appropriate for achieving the desired consequences.
The more detailed picture an agent has of his intended act and its

foreseen consequences

,

the more adept he is going to be in seeing that

the act is morally right, or morally wrong.

We find that many of the

controversial cases in our discussion of the PDE concern those actions
where the agent (1) intends

a

somewhat ill-defined action and foresees

some specific states of affairs as

a

consequence, or (2) intends

a

specific and well-defined action but is unclear as to the specifics
of the foreseen consequences or,

(3)

intends an ill-defined action

and foresees only general unspecified results.
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Some Additional Considerations

Finally, three other factors
come to play that

discussed.

a

have not yet

The first factor has to do
with the agent’s rationality

and mental competency.
at

I

If the agent is insane or is
unable to think

level of intelligence that we
would expect of most human beings,

then we are going to be less apt
to say that this agent is one
to

whom the PDE applies.

For if a person's perception of
reality is

seriously distorted or impaired, then
we may not think that he is
capable of making the moral distinctions
necessary for applying
the PDE.

Hence, we may not hold an agent morally
responsible for

his acts and intentions (under the PDE)
if he is not rational and

mentally competent.
The second additional factor has to do
with actions in which

more than one agent is required for an action
to be done.

As we

all know, certain actions are group efforts
in which each agent makes
a

separate contribution to the act but the overall act
cannot be

performed without all these sub-actions being done at roughly
the
same time.

In performing his sub-action, each agent may have

a

intention and foresight with respect to his own action
and that action's consequences than any other cooperating
agent
has with respect to his action and its consequences.

It is a matter

of concern for us to determine which, if any, of these individuals'

intentional attitudes are appropriate for assessing the overall act.
The last additional factor that plays a role here is that of
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habit.

By ’’habits"

I

mean an action that an agent performs
custom-

arily without reflecting on it when
certain circumstances occur.

I

take certain actions that are inculcated
by training and experience
to be habitual.

For example,

a

well-trained soldier will habitually

dive for cover when he hears an explosion
or small arms fire.

He

also will take overt aggressive action in
certain other situations.

While we are probably inclined to call these
actions intentional,
we may still find it difficult to determine
what the agent considers
the consequences of his action, if he considers
the consequences at
all.

Many habitual actions are instantaneous responses
to stimuli.

In some relatively minor cases, the agent often is
not even aware

that he is performing the action, let alone considering
the con-

sequence of it.

performed as

a

than survival.

mulled over.

In combat situations many habitual actions are

self-defense measure.

There is no other intention

That intention moreover, is unlikely to have been
Indeed, such action is almost Pavlovian in nature.

A Review of the PDF

Before considering some examples which

I

think pose problems for

the PDF, we ought to refresh our memory on some of the stipulations of

the PDF.
the PDF

To make this possible,
I

I

will present

presented in the first chapter.

I

a

truncated version of

will do this merely as a

convenience to help us focus our attention on the part of the PDF that
I

think is most important.

So,

for the purposes of this discussion

I
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will drop the third and fourth
condition of the earlier version and
simply assume that our examples fulfill
those two conditions.
The
revised version of the PDE now looks
like this:
PDE

It is morally permissible for an
agent to
perform an act which has both good and bad
consequences if and only if ( 1 ) The act
itself
IS morally good or at least indifferent
and
(2) The agent does not positively will
(intend)
the bad effect but merely permits it.

:

Condition (1) is the requirement that the action,
as intended, must
be such that it is not intrinsically evil.

The intended action must

be either morally good or morally neutral.

Condition (2) says that

the agent must not intend the bad consequences
even though they are

foreseen.
occur.

In foreseeing these consequences, he merely allows
them to

He is not required to do anything to prevent them
nor is he

required to intend that the bad consequences not occur.

The agent is

merely required to withhold his intention of producing these bad
effects.

By

withhold

'

I

mean that he fails to have an intention

either of producing the bad consequences or preventing them.

A Closer Look at Condition (1) of the PDE

While this version of the PDE may seem acceptable upon
look,

I

think

a

a

cursory

closer examination by us will help us see why it is

unclear and not particularly helpful.
cularly problematic.

The first condition is parti-

Having discussed the problem of delineating

acts and their consequences we can see better why this condition is

troublesome.

What do we mean when we say the "act itself is morally
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good?"

As we know the "act" can take
on any number of descriptions.

These descriptions can range from
talk about an agent's own basic

physical movements all the way to talk
of the most far-reaching

consequences of this basic physical action.

For instance, if we

say the "act itself" is the agent's
squeezing his finger then we
are prone to say that it is at least
"morally neutral."

On the

other hand, if we say that the "act itself"
is "shooting an innocent
child," then we are apt to say it is morally
wrong.
As we have already seen, under
deontological moral theory an act
IS wrong if It falls under a description
which makes it as described
a

violation of

moral rule.

a

But if all the acts we are considering

have some bad results, then each "act itself"
can be described as

morally bad.

Hence, if we read the first condition as saying
that

the act under any description must be good, then we
have made it

virtually impossible for any such act to be accepted as
permissible
under the PDF.

This is not, however, what

the PDE intended.

1

think the framers of

For they were very much concerned that certain

acts of killing in war should be accepted as morally permissible.
In order to avoid the difficulty mentioned above we might instead

read

the act itself" as meaning only the basic bodily movements the

agent himself performs in producing the action.
tion is also problematic.

Yet this interpreta-

We can describe almost any human action

this way without violating any moral rules.

We do not say that a

person's squeezing his finger is morally wrong:

we say it is the
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result of the agent squeezing his finger
that is wrong.

The physical

act is wrong because it can be described
in terms of its evil con-

sequences

.

It seems to me that we need to find
some middle ground between

these two extremes which captures the moral
intuition that the

advocates of the PDE are trying to convey.
(1)

On the one hand, condition

can be read as such a strict condition that
no actions with bad

consequences are permissible under the PDE while,
on the other hand,
it can be read so loosely that virtually any
action is morally per-

missible under the PDE.

Perhaps we ought to consider "the act itself"

in terms of how the agent himself envisions it.

We said earlier that

beliefs and intentions are about states of affairs (or
propositions).
Moreover, we said that different formulations of these states of
affairs describe our actions differently.

Moreover, we have indicated

that it is possible to hold different beliefs or intentions about what
is,

objectively speaking, the same state of affairs.

can intend to shoot at a silhouette of

a

For instance,

I

person approaching my position,

thinking it to be that of an enemy soldier, without intending to shoot
my company commander, whose silhouette it actually is.
So,

it appears that "the act itself" must refer to a specific

state of affairs that the agent believes will come about or intends
to bring about by doing the action.

morally good as the agent intends it.
element to our condition one.

The action, then, must be
We have now added the subjective

It is not so important that the intended
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state of affairs may be expressed as

a

moral wrong.

Instead, the

agent's belief about what state of affairs
he is producing is of
critical importance.

The state of affairs that his action
is directed

towards must not be in violation of some
moral prohibition.
in mind,

With that

let's reformulate our condition (l) of
the PDE in the

following way:
(1

)

The action as intended by the agent is
morally good
or at least morally indifferent.

This reformulation seems to capture the intuitions
of those who con-

ceived the PDE much better than condition
(1) does.
"as intended by the agent"

I

ceives the intended action.

By the phrase

mean under the description the agent conThus, according to condition (1') the

action must be morally good (neutral) according to the
description the
agent considers it under when he intends it.

A Closer Look at Condition (2) of the PDE

Let's now turn our attention to the second condition, especially
to the phrase "the agent

..

.merely permits it (the bad effect)."

We

might be tempted at first to attack condition (2) by saying that the
act of "permitting" is itself a form of intentional action.

That is,

when we "permit" some evil foreseen consequences, we have intended not
to prevent them.

By attacking the PDE this way, however,

are being a bit unfair to it.^*^

I

think we

We are denying the proponent of the PDE

the very distinction upon which the PDE is grounded, the distinction

between the intended and the merely permitted.

The proponent of the
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PDE would most probably deny that in
permitting these bad consequences
the agent intends not to prevent them.

He would probably say that

the agent entertains no intentions at
all with respect to the bad

consequences.

He neither intends them nor intends not
to prevent

them.

While we have eliminated that particular
objection to the
second condition,
discussion.

I

think that another issue regarding it warrants

Condition (2), as

I

have already stated, is predicted

upon the distinction between intending bad consequences
and merely

permitting them.

I

think that it is reasonable to say that the

deontologist proponent of the PDE wants to claim that
intentionally

bringing about bad consequences is morally worse than merely
permitting them.

Looking at this distinction another way, we might say

that acting to bring about bad consequences is worse than failing to
act to prevent them.

But, if we look at the distinction this way, it

would appear that intention does not play as central
as we might like to think.

a

role in the PDE

Instead the theory seems to turn on

tinction between acts and omissions.

a

dis-

If this is, in fact, the case,

then the PDE proponent is commited to the view that there is

a

moral

difference between our duties not commit intentional wrongs and our
duties to perform good acts.

By saying that it is worse to bring

about evil by acting than to bring it about by failing to act, he
is saying (in an oblique way)

that our duties to refrain from doing

evil acts are greater than our duties to perform good acts.
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Now we can begin to see the dilemma
condition (2) places us
in.
a

In most of Western society we accept
the view that we have both

negative duty

lives.

n^

to kill and we also have a positive
duty to save

If we accept condition (2) as it stands,
we are saying that

the agent must not intend the bad consequences
(i.e., killing innocent

civilians).

But, in permitting the deaths of innocent
poeple, we

are failing in our duty to save lives.

If we suppose that our act

as we intend it is good and that it brings
about an early end to a

war, thereby preventing many needless deaths in
the long run, then

by intending the "good" act and "permitting" its bad
consequences,
we have both fulfilled our duty to save lives and have
failed in

our duty to save lives.

Looking at it another way, we have said

that our duty not to kill takes precedence over our duty to save
lives.

In general, then, our duties not to commit intentional wrongs

take precedence over our duties to perform good acts.

For me, this conclusion is counter~intuitive
occasions on which

I

.

There are many

believe that an agent is obligated to perform

some positive act even if it means that he violates some duty to

refrain from doing an evil act.

My intuition is that positive and

negative duties should have equal status.

But, if they do have

equal status, then our only means of resolving conflicts between

positive and negative duties seems to be through some sort of

utilitarian calculation of the consequences.
One way to avoid the conclusion above is to alter condition
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(2)

so that does not turn on the
distinction between doing good and

refraining from doing evil.

We might do this in the following
way:

(2') The agent has no intention
with respect to the bad

consequences of his intended action, even
though he
foresees them as likely.

In this revised version of condition
(2), the agent must withhold his

intention with respect to the bad effects.

He must neither intend

them nor intend them to be permitted.

Unfortunately, if we now accept condition (2'), we
are faced with
a

problem of

a

different sort.

In requiring the agent to have no

intention whatsoever with regard to the foreseen bad
consequences of
his action, we may be asking too much of him
psychologically.

In

essence, what we are saying to the agent is, "Even though
you foresee
the killing of innocent people as a probable consequence
of the action
as you intend it, you cannot intend killing them nor can
you intend not

to prevent their deaths."

I

suggest that it is psychologically im-

possible to perform all three of these mental acts at the same time.
If the agent believes that particular bad consequences are likely to

result from his action and yet goes ahead with that action, then he has

tacitly intended to permit those bad consequences.

A Reformulation of the PDE

It now appears that we are in a difficult situation.

If we accept

condition (2) then, we must say that, for example, our duty not to kill
takes precedence over our duty to save lives.

As we have seen this is
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not

a

particularly satisfactory alternative.

On the other hand, if

we accept condition (2'), then we require the
agent to perform

psychologically impossible feat.

In summary, then,

(2)

a

requires us

to accept a counter-intuitive moral concept
while (2') requires us

to accept the idea that a psychologically impossible
feat is possible.

Neither alternative, then, is particularly attractive.
ask?

What now you

Well, perhaps we ought to grudgingly stick with condition
(2)

and see where it leads us in terms of practical examples.

Con-

sequently, let's clean up PDE^ and reformulate it this way:
PDE

As

I

2
:

It is morally permissible for an agent to perform
an act which has both good and bad consequences
if and only if (1) the action, as intended by
the agent is morally good, or at least morally
neutral and (2) the agent does not intend the
bad effect as a direct consequence of his action
but merely permits it.

have stated before,

tion of the PDE.

1

However,

eliminates the problems

I

am not particularly happy with this formula1

can think of no better formulation which

have already enumerated.

Let's press on and see how this version of the PDE stands up to
some difficult practical problems.

I

will discuss four cases that

1

believe that the PDE should resolve, but which cannot.

Nine Factors that Affect the PDE

Before looking at these examples, though,
review some of the major factors that

action is evaluated under the PDE.

I

I

would like briefly to

feel play a part in how an

These factors are:
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(1)

How specifically the agent envisions
his intended action
and its foreseen consequences.

(2)

How much the agent knows of (and perceives
as relevant)
the circumstances surrounding his action.

(3)

How much moral emphasis the agent gives to
each of
the alternatives he sees as available
to him.

(4)

How rational and mentally competent the agent
is.

(5)

How much time the agent has available to make
his decision.

(6)

How much stress the agent is under when making his
decision.

(7)

Whether or not the agent is reacting to the situation
in
a

habitual manner.

(8)

How much of

(9)

Whether the agent's intent is to perform some positive act

a

role other actors play in the agent's action.

or refrain from performing some positive act.

The "No-Win" Situation

My first example concerns cases in which the agent is caught in
"no-win" situation.

a

That is, there are situations in which the agent

is confronted with only two basic alternatives.

particular action or he does not.

Either he performs

a

If he performs the deed, he will

bring about good and bad consequences.

If he does not perform it, he

will also bring about good and evil consequences.

Perhaps this example will aid us in seeing this point.
unit is defending one of its country's own cities.

An army

Instead of leaving
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their homes and becoming refugees, many of
the civilian populace have

decided to remain in the city with this army
unit.
more protected in doing so.

Perhaps they feel

However, in the course of

a

larger battle

the city is surrounded by enemy forces who begin
preparation to assault
the city.

The enemy army is known for its brutal treatment
of both

military and civilian prisoners.

They have committed all sorts of

crimes against innocent civilians in the past, including
murder,

pillaging, plundering and the like.

The commander of the army unit

charged with the defense of the city is faced with two basic
alternatives.

Either he orders his army to fight or he orders his army

to capitulate.

Let

s

assume that either action might be considered

good under the description which the commander intends to perform
them.

Moreover, his intended direct result of choosing either

alternative is other than to produce the harm of civilians.

However,

it is foreseeable (or perhaps even certain) that widespread civilian

harm will result from either alternative.

The choice boils down to

either fighting and bringing about harm to civilians or capitulating
(not fighting) and bringing about harm to civilians.

In either case

the harm done to the civilians is a direct result of his decision.
As we already know from our previous discussion, the PDE is

supposed to aid us in deciding which acts among our alternatives are

permissible and which are not.

However, if all the alternatives we

have open to us are such that in order to perform any of them we

must intend an action which produces some bad results, then our

decision seems to come down to

a

matter of deciding which of the

two evil consequences is preferable.

some form of utilitarianism.
the example.

It comes down, that is, to

This is what seems to be the case in

Instead of focusing on the moral worth of
the commander'

two alternative actions, we must shift our
consideration to the con-

sequences of the action.
A deontologist, in order to avoid this result,
seems to have only
two possible replies here.

The first thing he might say is that he

admits there are these "no-win" situations in life
where the agent is

committed to doing wrong whichever alternative he chooses.

He might

add that even though these situations do occur, that
does not mean

that the PDE is not useful for many other situations.

The deontologist'

s

other alternative is to say that in situations

like this what is important is whether the agent produces the evil

by

a

positive intentional act or by intentionally refraining from

doing that act.

In our example case, he must say that there is a

putative moral difference between fighting and not fighting (capitulating).

Perhaps he might say that not fighting is the correct alter-

native in the example case because the commander and his men do not

actively bring about the bad consequences.

The enemy does.

Whatever reply the deontologist makes here, he has weakened his
position.

If he makes the first reply, he admits that the PDE can

give no guidance in terms of the relative moral worth of two actions,
be they good or bad.

The PDE merely assists us in determining
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whether acts are permissible or
impermissible.

The commander in

our example must perform one of the
two alternatives.
the one he necessarily does the other.

By not doing

To tell him it is impermissible

to do either of the acts is no help
whatsoever.

makes the second reply by saying that there
is

If the deontologist

moral difference

a

between acting and refraining, then he
places himself on very
controversial philosophical ground.

1

have already given my

opinion on this matter earlier in the chapter.

The Problem of Taking Moral Risks

A similar yet separate problem to the one

what

1

call the problem of moral risk taking.

just discussed is

1

Often in combat

soldiers must take dangerous risks to perform good acts.
such acts of bravery are encouraged to

a

degree.

In fact

However, if the

PDE makes a moral distinction between acting and refraining from
acting, then in essence it implies that we not take moral risks.
To see what

1

mean let's consider this example.

Private Hill has been wounded seriously in

a

fire fight.

Sergeant

Ramos sees that Hill is wounded badly and realizes that Hill must be

evacuated immediately or he will probably die.

However, to get Hill

to safety Ramos must first drag Hill across an open area.

The chance

of both of them being shot and killed in this open area is also fairly
high.

If Ramos intends to save Hill's life, then we would probably

say that this is

a

morally good action.

But, then again, we would not

90

say that he would be acting in

a

morally wrong manner if he left Hill

alone, considering the risk involved.

It is fairly clear that if

Ramos intends to save Hill's life some
bad consequences are likely to
occur.

On the other hand, if Ramos intends not
to save Hill’s life

some bad consequences are also likely
to occur.

probably say that since there is

a

Many of us would

chance of saving Hill's life by

getting him out of the location he presently
is in, this course of

action IS at least morally permissible, if not
preferable to the
other course of action.

PDE advocates, however, are in the uncom-

fortable position of saying that it is morally
preferable for Ramos
to take no physical action with regard to Hill.

Letting Hill die

is better than causally contributing to his death.

me to be plainly counter-intuitive.

This seems to

Almost any action where harm is

risked to prevent harm from coming about falls into this category.
Clearly, we would like to keep this kind of option open to moral
agents.

The deontologist who supports the PDE says this is not an

acceptable option.

The Problem of Non-Specific Intentions

The third type of problem case that the PDE is unable to resolve

adequately is that situation where the agent is not sure what his
specific intention is in an action.

In the second chapter

ized an intention as a disposition to act.

disposition to act in

a

And

I

I

character-

said that we have

particular manner when we suppose we are in

a
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special circumstances that warrant
our acting in that manner.
As I
also pointed out in that chapter,
one of the most critical
problems
of justifying our intentions,
and consequently our behavior,
is that
of insuring that we are, in
fact, in the appropriate
circumstances

which trigger our intentions.
epistemological problem.

Now, this problem is not merely
an

It is not just a matter of
being skeptical

about what our senses seem to tell
us is the case.

It is also a

matter of what things we do and do not
perceive, what emphasis
we place on each particular perception
we do have, and in which

way we put all these perceptions
together into

a

"complete picture"

of the situation.
We have all been in situations at some
time or other where we

have performed an action which, after
reflecting on it, we were

not sure what our intention was in doing the
action.
this type of situation is relatively commonplace.

ception can be obstructed in any number of ways.

In combat

The agent's per-

For instance, both

the enemy's tactics and the effects of the weapons
the enemy uses

serve to obfuscate what is actually occurring.

situations where the agent has

a

which his action will satisfy.

We can imagine

fairly general intention in mind
Moreover, we can imagine that he

foresee some general consequence which may be construed as evil.

Nonetheless, his action will, in fact, be a different one than he
had intended and its evil consequences will be different ones than he
had foreseen.

Let's consider

a

practical situation which exemplifies
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this problem.

Let's suppose that

a

certain commander receives an intelligence

report that informs him that an enemy
battalion is occupying

tegically located town.

a

stra-

He knows that if he can destroy, or at
least

effectively defeat, that battalion, then it
will be to his own unit's
great advantage.

Perhaps the enemy is in

a

position to disrupt his

own tactical activities.
Now, let's also imagine that our commander
knows only that an

enemy battalion is in that town.

He does not know which enemy unit

It IS, what kind it is, nor who any of the
individuals are in that

battalion.

In drawing up this plan he states only the intention
of

attacking and destroying "the enemy battalion" located in
the town.
Let's also suppose that our commander foresees that some innocent

civilians located in the town will be killed by his action.
sight is also somewhat non-specific.

His fore-

He foresees only that the

potential innocent victims of his action are "occupants" of the town.
Again, he does not envision them as "lifelong residents of the town"
or as specific individuals who reside in the town.
In our example, we will make believe that some curious things

happen the night before our commander is due to attack the town.
battle erupts in the sector adjacent to our commander's.

As a result

of that battle, the enemy unit in the town redeploys to reinforce

other enemy units already fighting the battle.

A

Unbeknownst to our
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commander, the enemy battalion moves out
of the town he is supposed
to attack the next day.

(The raging battle engages his
intelligence

sources and distracts them from observing
the town that night.)
Let’s also say that the battlefield noises
and smoke veiled the noise
of the enemy battalion’s movement and
blocked any visual observation

of it.

That very night the civilians located in the
town, rightfully

fearing for their own lives, decide to evacuate
the town.
them leave.

All of

Our commander is not aware of this fact either.

let us imagine that the town is unoccupied for

a

So,

short period of time.

Later that night, however, another enemy battalion moves
into
the town to replace the now deployed battalion.

positions the other battalion had held.

It reoccupies the

In addition, a large number

of civilian refugees fleeing the ensuing battle also filter into
the

town looking for shelter.

We will suppose that there are many more

of these civilians than there were in the town before.

Once again,

we will also imagine that these events go unnoticed by our commander.
It is now early the next morning and the commander has his

unit poised and ready to attack the town.

He still has the intention

of attacking and destroying ”an enemy battalion” and he still foresees that ’’innocent civilians” will be killed in the town as an

unintended side effect of his attack.

Nonetheless, the specific

individuals upon whom the intention and foresight are directed
have completely changed.
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At 0430 hours that morning the commander
orders the attack.
In the following melee the commander does
accomplish his mission.

His intention of destroying the enemy battalion
is accomplished.

Let's say that this action is at least morally
indifferent, or

perhaps better in that it will serve to shorten the war
and, as
a

result fewer lives will be lost overall and less damage
will be

done to the area where the war is being fought.

Just to be safe,

we will also say it is morally good in terms of some
short-range

moral consequences.

Unfortunately, despite the good consequence, the act also
produces some very bad "side effects."

Due to the fact that

a

large number of civilians are present in the town, many of them are

also killed in the battle.

Some are killed by artillery fire that

impacts on the buildings in which they are hiding while many others

panic and are killed in the exchange of fire between the two units when
they try to escape.

Because of the smoke, noise, and limited light,

many of them are mistaken as soldiers moving about in the town and are
gunned down.

What are we to say about this episode with respect to the PDE?
I

think in several respects it is difficult to see exactly how the

PDE applies here.

First of all, it is confusing just who the inten-

tional objects of our commander's attack are.

Did our commander

intend to destroy the unit that moved out of the town or did he intend
to destroy the unit that replaced it?

His intention of "destroying
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the enemy battalion" is not specific
enough for us to determine which

unit the commander meant.

Any unit that fits the description
of being

an enemy battalion would have been
satisfactory as the object of the

commander's intention (even an enemy medical
battalion).
The same sort of thing could also be said
about the commander's

foresight as to who would probably be killed
as
action.

a

result of his

His foresight that "innocent civilians"
in the town would

be killed could apply to

a

wide range of people who were unlucky

enough to be in that town at the wrong time.
In one sense we are tempted to say the PDE
applies here and that

the commander's action has met our criterion.

However, in another

sense, many of us might be reluctant to say that the
commander actually

intended

to destroy the battalion that he did or that he "foresaw"

the deaths of the civilians that were killed.

His intent and foresight

were just not specific enough to say what he intended or foresaw.

That

is, we tend to think of intention and foresight applying to
specific

people, things, and situations.

For example,

I

sentence with this particular black pencil that

intend to write this
I

am holding in my

left hand, on this particular piece of paper, and at this particular
time.

We are also tempted to say that the commander's stated intention

and foresight really do not qualify as a true intention and foresight.
If we make the claim that the commander's intention and foresight

are not specific enough and claim that one must have more specific

intentions and foresights in mind, then we run into

a

difficult problem.

96

That problem is how to determine that
the described object of one's

intention is specific enough to meet the
criteria of the PDE.

In our

example case we might want to say that the
commander had to know

specifically which unit he intended to destroy
and which group of
people he foresaw were going to die as

a

consequence of his attack.

But, surely this is an absurd, if not
impossible demand to make in

many cases.

It requires us,

for instance, to determine just what

unit is attacking us (if we are attacked) before we
fight back.

It

also requires us to determine moment to moment just
who our potential

victims are.
have

a

In war that is, practically speaking, impossible.

To

perfectly specific intention we would have to know who each

and every individual involved in the situation is.
not want to require that!

Surely, we do

So we are caught in a dilemma.

Do we

allow "non-specific" intentions and foresight to count and thereby
"ambiguate" the PDE or do we require "strictly specific" intentions
and foresight thereby precluding any action under the PDE in

situations where we are not sure exactly of what we intend or
foresee?

And, if so, where do we draw the line between "specific"

and "non-specific" intentions?

The important point here is that the individual who advocates
the PDE must be willing to agree that either the PDE does not apply
to all situations in which good and bad consequences are produced

or that some questionable assumptions with regard to agent inten-

tions must be made.

If he agrees that the first disjunct is true.
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then he admits that practical application
of the PDE is much more

restricted than he might like to admit.

That is, it does not apply

to many cases in which he would be
tempted to use it.

On the other

hand, if he wants to say that the PDE
applies to all actions that

have good and bad consequences, then he has
to make some basic pre-

sumptions about all action which are not necessarily
true.

presumptions are that

a

These

conscientious moral agent will always
(1) be

able to consider alternative actions and consequences
and that it is
to his moral advantage to do so and
(2) be able to think of his

intended action and consequences in specific enough terms
so that it
is not ambiguous as to whom or what they are
directed.

it is dangerous to make either of these assumptions.

think that

1

So it seems

that whichever disjunct the PDE advocate chooses here, he
should

agree that either of them substantially undermines the scope and
force of the PDE.

The Problem of "Collective” Intention

The last type of problem case

I

would like to discuss is that in

which an action requires multiple agents.
situations where this is the case.
seem to stand out.

We can think of innumerable

Of these many situations two types

First, there are those cases where

a

group of

individuals must act simultaneously for an action to be performed.

bomber crew in the process of accomplishing its mission is
example of this.

a

good

One man must be flying the aircraft, one man must

A
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be navigating it to the proper target,
and one man must be prepared
to drop the bombs once the aircraft
gets to its target.

If any of

these simultaneous efforts are absent then
the specific action cannot
be completed.

For the airplane must be flying to drop the
bombs, it

must be in the correct location to destroy
the proper target and some
one must drop the bombs when the aircraft
is over the target.

The second situation

I

want to consider is that in which

a

chain

of action must occur in order for some overall
action to occur.

This

is an especially problematic situation when
different agents perform

different actions in this chain of action.
situation

I

The kind of specific

have in mind is that where the chain is initiated by
an

individual who has one intention, foreseeing certain consequences,
and is completed by an individual who has another intention,
fore-

seeing different consequences.
a

This type of case might occur when

general gives an order with the overall perspective as to how the

ordered action is to fit in with the overall circumstances.

Yet,

his order is executed by individuals who may have very limited

perspectives as to how the action is to fit in with the overall
situation.

We can see that this perspective may be distorted with

the addition of intermediaries between the general and the persons

who carry out his orders.

One situation that illustrates this idea

well is that case in which an Air Force general orders
be fired on a particular target.

a

missile to

The order is then passed down

through the chain of command until it reaches

a

particular missile

.
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crew located inside

a

missile silo.

The crew, however, is aware

only that the missile will be directed at
an enemy target; which
one they do not know.

The Bomber Crew Example

Now that we have identified what
cases, let's take

a

1

take to be two problematic

closer look at each one of them.

bomber crew has been given the mission to bomb
complex deep in the enemy country's heartland.

a

Suppose that

a

particular industrial
(We will assume that

the enemy country was the aggressor in this war and that
without the

industrial capabilities provided by this complex the enemy will
not
be able to continue fighting the war.)

cular problem.

However, there is one parti-

This industrial complex borders on a large inhabited

residential area.

In the act of destroying the industrial complex,

the bomber crew will undoubtedly damage some of the residential area,

thereby killing and injuring some of the civilian residents of the
area

Each member of the crew has the intention of performing his
own particular duties which must be performed if the action is to
occur.

Each crew member also intends that the mission of dropping

the bombs is completed satisfactorily.

Moreover, they all also

foresee that some innocent civilians will be killed.

When they

reach the target each member of the crew performs his particular
sub-action, the bombs fall on the complex and destroy it.

A number

.
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of innocent civilians are killed as a result.

My concern in this example is not with the
intention involved here,
but instead with just who or what agent has the
intention.

If we

concern ourselves merely with the actual dropping
of the bombs on the
target, we probably would point to the bombadier and
say that he is
the fellow who has performed the action.

But clearly it is unfair to

charge only the bombadier with the action, especially if
it has largescale bad effects.

He has not acted in

a

vacuum.

His being able to

perform the act of dropping the bombs is dependent on the appropriate
action of other members of the crew.

Similarly, if we try to blame

either the pilot or the navigator individually we run into the same
problem.
crew as

It seems, then, that the action must be attributed to the
a

whole.

But as Joseph Margolis put it:

Nothing can perform an act or have an interest
that is not at the very least alive, sentient,
intelligent.
Human beings singly or aggregatively, satisfy these conditions.
But a
collective entity--a corporation, for instance-can onljr^have interests imputed to it by human
agents
Margolis is saying, essentially, the corporations or bomber crews
are fictitious entities.

It is only in a manner of speaking that

we can attribute intentions to them.

To attribute an intention in

reality to a bomber crew or corporation is an error.
crews and corporations are not thinking beings.

For bomber

So to say that

"the bomber crew intends to bomb an industrial complex" is not

literally true.

101

Where does this leave us?

On one hand we want to say that
it

IS unfair to attribute the intention
for the whole action on any

one individual in the crew while on
the other hand we want to say

that it is not correct to say that the
intention lies with the

bomber crew, as

a

collective entity, either.

Now, the PDE seems to be designed so that
we can presuppose

that collective agents intend, foresee, act,
etc.

However,

1

think

this is an unsatisfactory supposition for the
foregoing reasons.

We

cannot assume that "collective intentions" are
representative of the
sum of individual intentions of the persons who
compose this group.

The Missile Silo Example

Another way to look at this problem is by considering the case
where the overall action is such that several different agents each

contribute an individual sub-action in
second example, let's suppose that

a

a

chain of action.

general gives the order for

missile to be fired on some military target.

military target to be destroyed.

As in our
a

He intends for that

However, he also foresees that

a

number of civilians may be killed by the detonation of the missile
on its target.

We will assume that the general does not know which

specific missile will be fired to accomplish this task.

Nonetheless,

the general does know what impact the firing of the missile is to

have on the overall situation, as he is aware of it.

firing of this missile plays

a

part in

a

That is, the

grand strategy which he.

but none of his subordinates, is aware
of.

Let's say now that this order is given
to some lesser-ranking

general in charge of the missile units.

We will say that this

general's understanding of the use of the
missile in the overall

strategy is less comprehensive than his
superior's but he still has
a

pretty good idea what the intended effect is
to be.

This general

however, does know which specific unit under his
command he will

assign the task of firing the missile.

He does not know which

missile will be fired, though.
This general who is in charge of the missile units
then passes
the order to the specific missile unit commander,

a

colonel, who ha

virtually no idea of the "grand strategy" but knows which missile
crew to assign the mission.

His foresight of the effects of firing

the missile at the target is far less comprehensive than the
two

generals.

This colonel in turn orders the captain in charge of

the crew to arm and fire the missile.

While the captain controls

the overall procedure in the missile silo, one of his subordinates,
a

certain lieutenant, will actually perform the launch procedures.

We will assume that neither the captain nor the lieutenant knows

specifically where the missile is targeted.
it is aimed at some enemy military target.
is to

perform

a

They know only that
Their intention then

successful launch of the missile at an unknown

enemy target.
It should be becoming clear now what the problem is here.

If
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the missile is successfully launched and
destroys the enemy target,

then we have an interesting problem with regard
to the PDE.

The

individual who initiates the overall action by giving
the command
that a specific target be destroyed, thereby
foreseeing the resultant

deaths of innocent civilians, does not perform the
actual firing of
the missile nor does he even know which missile is
to be fired.

On

the other hand, the person who completes the action by
firing the

missile has a much more limited intention in doing so than the
original general.

Moreover, his foresight in the matter is ex-

tremely limited, since he is ignorant of where the missile is

targeted and for what reasons it is being used.
Once again the PDE gives us no real assistance in the consider-

ation of the overall action.

For, we are not talking of

agent performing the entire action.

a

single

The intention of the general

who initiates the action is not the same as that of the lieutenant
who eventually performs the action.

In addition, what the general

foresees is much different than what the lieutenant foresees.
We can safely say here that the lieutenant's act would not be

performed if the general did not give the order.

The general's

intention is inextricably linked to the lieutenant's action.

But,

we do not want to say what the general intends is what the lieutenant

intends.

That is, the lieutenant's action is not caused by the

general's intention, at least not in any direct sense.

The consider-

ations the general entertains in giving the order are not those that
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the lieutenant entertains in carrying
out the order.

try to consider the entire chain of action
as

action we have

a

a

So,

if we

single overall

difficult problem in connecting the intention
that

is involved in the overall action
with the intentions in each of

the sub-actions which make up the overall
action.
If we consider the general's sub-action and
the lieutenant's sub-

action as two separate and causally related actions,
then we run
into

a

problem of

a

different sort.

The general's action is merely

one of ordering and its consequences is that of bringing
about certain

actions on the part of his subordinates.

The problem, however, is

that although we say that his order induces these subordinates
to

perform certain actions, the subordinates at each level have the
option of either following or not following the order.

So,

it is

not as if the general directly and unavoidably causes the ultimate

consequences of his action.
results of his action.

So,

The consequences are not the necessary
it is difficult to morally judge the

permissibility of the general's action.
The lieutenant, on the other hand, is in

a

position such that

he does not intend the specific action the general does nor does he

foresee the bad consequences of his action in the specific way the

general does.
I

Earlier, when

I

discussed the notion of foresight,

stated that we normally think that an agent has done no moral

wrong if he could not foresee the bad effects of his performing an
action.

In the lieutenant's case he is in an epistemically blind
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position with regard to the specific consequences
of his action.

He

believes that his intended action will produce
the effect of "destroying an enemy military target."

He can in no way specifically determine

whether innocent civilians will be killed as
not.

That is

a

a

result of an action or

matter of pure speculation for him.

As a result, we

are in the peculiar position of having to say that
his act is per-

missible, even though it might have the vilest of consequences,
because
the lieutenant neither intends, nor foresees these evil
consequences.

Conclusion

In conclusion, then,

I

find the PDE most unhelpful in many

situations where it is supposed to be of assistance.

First, for the

PDE to be a viable doctrine one has to say that one's duty not to

perform harmful actions takes precedence over one's duty to perform
beneficial actions.
open to debate.

At the very least, this is a notion very much

If it is incorrect as

I

believe, then the PDE

collapses as a viable doctrine.
Second, there are many situations where the agent may formulate
a

general intention in doing some action.

The agent's view of the

situation, however, may be so loose and non-specific that any number
of actual situations can fulfill his expressed intention and fore-

sight.

The question becomes whether the agent intends each and every

one of these state of affairs.

I

think not.

Unfortunately, the PDE

does not give us strict enough criteria for how specific the agent's
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intention and foresight must be.

As a result, it probably allows more

questionable intentional actions than it should
because these actions
are couched in non-specific terms.

Finally, the PDF fails to help us with actions
in which more than
one agent is involved.

To apply the PDF, we must assume that we can

make sense of notions like the "intentions of
corporate entities" and

intentional "chains-of-actions" where one agent has
the overall

intention and foresight for the act which is to be judged,
while
another agent actually performs the action.

Once again,

1

find

both of these notions confusing.
The PDF is not a viable theory.

The problem is not as some

philosophers have suggested, that is is unable to account for the
massive and indiscriminate effects of modern weapons; the problem
is that it is grounded in doubtful philosophical concepts.

My

contention is, then, that the PDF has been incorrect and unhelpful
all along; we have just failed to understand that is so.
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A variation on the "unifier" position has been offered
by both
Judith Jarvis Thompson and Lawrence Davis. Like Davidson
and Anscombe,
they understand actions as events capable of multiple
descriptions.
However, unlike them, Thomson and Davis deny that all acts are
"primitive" ones. They suggest that some acts are sequences of
causally related events including both a fundamental bodily movement
and some of its effects.
See Lawrence Davis, "Individuation of
Actions," Journal of Philosophy Vol. 67 (August, 1970),
pp. 520-530;
and Judith Jarvis Thompson, "The Time of Killing," The Journal of
Philosophy
Vol. 68
(March, 1971), pp. 115-132.
,

,

Donald Davidson,
of Carl S. Hempel
pp. 216-234.
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eds
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"The Individuation of Events," Essays in Honor
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(Dordrecht, 1969),
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Among those whom I consider "multipliers" are Alvin Goldman and
Jaegwon Kim.
See Alvin Goldman, A Theory of Human Action
(Englewood
Cliffs, 1970), Chapters 1 and 2; Alvin Goldman,
"The Individuation
of Actions," Journal of Philosophy Vol. 68
(November, 1971),
Jaegwon Kim,
pp. 761-774;
"Events and Their Descriptions:
Some
Considerations," Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel eds., N. Rescher
et al.,
(Dordrecht, 1969), pp. 198-215 and; Jaegwon Kim,
"On the
Psycho-Physical Identity Theory," American Philosophical Quarterly,
(1966), pp. 227-235.
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,

Alvin Goldman, "The Individuation of Action,"
Philosophy Vol. 68 (November, 1971), p. 771.

Journal of

,

36

We could adjust this comment to also fit with the "multiplier"
position. While Goldman, for example, wants to claim that each act
properly exemplified by an agent at a time is a distinct act, he
allows for the intuitive unity between certain of his acts by means
of an "act-tree."
It seems to me that to make the same point against
Goldman we just have to say that there is probably at least one act
on a particular act tree that has a property which we consider morally
bad

37

I am assuming here that Williams has made a reasonable effort
proper precautions against injuring innocent civilians. For
take
to
example, he should observe the target long enough to determine the
time when it would be least likely for him to fire and kill civilians
yet still destroy the target.

.
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See Joseph Margolis
"War and Ideology," Philos ophy. Morality
and International Affairs, eds.
Virginia Held, et al.,
(London, 1974),
pp. 246-265.

Chapter IV

Some psychologists and philosophers have suggested that we
have "unconscious intentions" or intentions that we do
not consciously
reflect on in some actions. Others have accounted for these
actions
by saying that such activity is voluntary but non-intentional
It
seems to me that the idea of intention revolves on the agent
knowingly
willing his action. The term "unconscious intention" is, to me at
least, self-contradictory.
.

40
I

want to thank Gary Matthews for bringing this point to my

attention
See Philippa Foot, "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine
of Double Effect," The Oxford Review Vol. 5 (1967), pp. 10-14.
,

A number of interesting articles have been written on this
topic.
If the reader is interested in pursuing this matter further,
then I suggest reading Bonnie Steinbock's anthology. Killing and
Letting Die (Englewood Cliffs, 1980).
,
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We can see that the "problem of moral risk-taking" is relevant
to many major decisions in combat.
Most people recognize, for example,
the Normandy Invasion as a great turning point in World War II.
Great
good was brought about by this action (i.e., a much earlier end to the
war in Europe, etc.) and yet tremendous risks were also taken. Had the

allies not been successful many soldiers on both sides would have died
needlessly and perhaps the Nazis would have been able to continue with
their many nefarious projects.
44

Joseph Margolis, "War and Ideology," Philosophy, Morality and
International Affairs eds. Virginia Held et al., (London, 1974), p. 255.
,
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